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The Uniform Arbitration Act*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is an overview of recent court decisions that interpret state versions
of the Uniform Arbitration Act ("U.A.A.").' Arbitration statutes patterned after the
U.A.A. have been adopted by thirty-four states and the District of Columbia. The
goal of this project is to promote uniformity in the interpretation of the U.A.A. by
articulating the underlying policies and rationales of recent court decisions
interpreting the U.A.A.3
11. SECTION 1: VALIDITY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Section 1 of the U.A.A. states:
[a] written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or
a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy
thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and
irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract. This act also applies to arbitration agreements
between employers and employees or between their respective
representatives [unless otherwise provided in the agreement].
4
Courts are called upon repeatedly to analyze and apply numerous sections of the
U.A.A. However, before a court can consider any of the various issues raised by the
U.A.A., it must determine if a valid agreement to arbitrate has been entered into by
the parties. Questions surrounding the validity of an agreement range from deciding
whether technical requirements have been met to determining the scope of the
agreement to arbitrate. Section 1 of the U.AA. deals with these questions.
* This project was prepared by Journal of Dispute Resolution Candidates under the direction of
Associate Editor in Chief Benjamin K. Byrd and Member Daniel S. Cohen.
1. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT §§ 1-25, 7 U.L.A. 1 (1997) [hereinafter"U.A.A."l.
2. Jurisdictions that have adopted arbitration statutes based on the U.A.A. include: Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia and Wyoming.
3. This Article surveys cases decided between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 1998.
4. U.A.A. § 1.
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A. Prerequisites
Before a court can analyze an arbitration agreement to determine its scope, the
court must determine if certain prerequisites have been met, to ascertain if a valid
agreement exists at all. In Messer v. Messer,5 the South Carolina Court of Appeals
dealt with an arbitration provision that appeared in a separation agreement.6 Under
the South Carolina U.A.A., a contract containing an arbitration clause must have a
notice on the front page stating that the contract contains an arbitration provision.7
The separation agreement in question had no such notice.' However, a family court
adopted the separation agreement in a divorce decree. 9 The ex-husband argued that
the arbitration provision was valid, in spite of the missing notice requirement,
because the family court had adopted the agreement.'0 The South Carolina Court of
Appeals disagreed, holding that because the provision was originally part of a
contract, the notice requirement applied, regardless of the contract's adoption into
the divorce decree." Therefore, the arbitration provision was invalid for failure to
meet South Carolina's U.A.A. notice requirement.' 2
Another prerequisite that may need to be established is the fulfillment of any
conditions precedent. In L & L Kempwood Ass 'n v. Omega Builders, Inc.,3 the
Texas court held that it was proper for the trial court to determine if all conditions
precedent had been met to determine if the arbitration agreement was valid."' The
appellate court reasoned that this determination logically belonged to the courts
instead of an arbitrator because the question of whether or not all conditions
precedent have been met will determine the validity or invalidity of the arbitration
agreement."' If the conditions precedent question went before an arbitrator, and it
determined the conditions had not been met, the arbitrator would be making a
determination concerning parties over which it had no binding authority, because the
arbitration agreement would be invalid. 6 The court further stated that, in the
interests of efficiency,' 7 a court should make a determination regarding the
fulfillment of the conditions precedent when it has the case before it, rather than
sending the issue to the arbitrator who may send the case back to the court if he finds
that all the conditions have not been met.'8
The presence of mutual consent between the parties is another prerequisite to a
valid arbitration agreement. The Eighth Circuit addressed the question of the need
5. 509 S.E.2d 486 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998).
6. Id. at 487.
7. Id. This notice requirement is not found in the model version of the U.A.A. U.A.A. § 1.
8. 509 S.E.2d at 488.
9. Id. at 486.
10. Id. at 487.
11. Id:
12. Id. at 488.
13. 972 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. App. 1998).
14. Id. at 823.
15. Id. at 825.
16. Id.
17. The court noted that efficiency of cost and time is often cited as the most valuable aspect of
arbitration. Id.
18. Id.
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for mutual consideration for an arbitration provision found in a franchise agreement
in Barker v. Golf US.A., Inc. 9 Applying Oklahoma law, the Eighth Circuit held that
there is no requirement that there be independent consideration for the arbitration
clause in a contract.20 The court relied on Oklahoma precedent holding that
arbitration clauses are not separable from the rest of the contract. 1 Therefore, the
court reasoned, mutual obligation between the parties need only exist for the contract
as a whole, and no independent consideration for the arbitration clause was
required.2
B. Who Can Be Bound by an Arbitration Agreement?
Many cases involve the ability of a party to agree to arbitration on behalf of
other parties. In Jenkins v. Percival,23 the Utah Supreme Court analyzed the
authority of an insurance claims adjuster to bind his employer to an arbitration
agreement.24 After discussing the general role of an insurance adjuster, the court
held that the adjuster did have the authority to bind his employer to an arbitration
agreement. The court also discussed if an insured can be bound by an arbitration
agreement between the insurance company and a claimant that alleges damages due
to the insured.' The supreme court reasoned that an insured could be bound by an
arbitration agreement only to the limits of the insured's policy.' The Utah Supreme
Court held that an arbitration agreement could not bind the insured beyond the policy
limits without his express agreement.2 ' To allow the insurance company to
unilaterally bind the insured beyond his policy limits would be to deny him his
"substantial right" to seek relief from the judicial system.28 The court did state,
however, that the insured could waive this right if such waiver was "voluntary,
intelligent, and knowing.' 29
In Tipton County Department of Public Instruction v. Delashmit Electric Co.,30
a Tennessee Appellate Court held that the Tipton County Board of Education
("Board") had the authority to bind itself to arbitration.3 Furthermore, the court held
that a third party surety could effectively stand in the shoes of a principal who was
a party to an arbitration agreement, and enforce the arbitration provisions. 2 In
Tipton, the Board entered into a contract with Delashmit Electric Company
("Delashmit") to have Delashmit perform electrical work on a new school building.33
19. 154 F.3d 788 (8th Cir. 1998).
20. Id. at 792.
21. Id. (citing Shaffer v. Jeffery, 915 P.2d 910 (Okla. 1996)).
22. Id. at 791-92.
23. 962 P.2d 796 (Utah 1998).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 799.
26. Id:
27. Id.
28. Id. (citing Bracken v. Dahle, 251 P. 16, 20 (Utah 1926)).
29. Id. at 799.
30. No. 02A01-9704, 1998 WL 158774 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 1998).
31. Id. at *3.
32. Id.
33. Id. at *1.
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Delashmit gave the Board a performance bond, issued by Frontier Insurance
Company ("Frontier"), promising that, should Delashmit fail to finish the work
contracted for, Frontier would complete the job itself, or pay to have another
company do it.34 Even though Frontier was not a signatory to the original contract
between the Board and Delashmit, the court ruled that, as a surety, Frontier could
enforce the arbitration provisions in the contract."
In D. Wilson Construction Co. v. Cris Equipment Co., Inc.,36 the Texas Court
of Appeals held that the Texas General Arbitration Act ("T.G.A.A.") is not limited
solely to disputes between nonprofit organizations, but applies to any parties who
have a written agreement to arbitrate.37 The court reached this conclusion in spite
of some statutory language that indicated a requirement that the parties be non-profit
organizations.38 The Texas court relied primarily on the only prior case it could find
analyzing the T.G.A.A.,39 in which the Texarkana Court of Appeals found that,
through the T.G.A.A., Texas had adopted the U.A.A., which does not limit its
application to non-profit organizations.40
Occasionally an arbitration clause will be held invalid as against public policy.
A trial de novo clause in an arbitration agreement was struck down as against
Colorado public policy in Huizar v. Allstate Insurance Co.4 ' The dispute in Huizar
arose from an automobile accident in which the plaintiff was a passenger.42 The
driver of the vehicle the plaintiff was in was uninsured, so the plaintiff sought
recovery for her injuries from her own insurance. Her insurance contract contained
an arbitration provision that allowed both the insurer and insured to invoke
arbitration in the event of a dispute.43 However, the agreement also contained a
provision allowing either party to have a trial de novo on the issues arising from the
dispute when the arbitration award exceeds $25,000 .4 The Colorado Supreme Court
held this provision invalid due to the disparity in bargaining power in insurance
contract situations, as well as the effect the clause has of essentially rendering the
arbitration meaningless when the award exceeds the limit set out in the policy. 45
As with other contracts, courts assume that when a party signs a contract that
includes an arbitration agreement, the party has read and understands the provisions
of the contract, and will be bound by it.46 In Johnson v. Lynn Hickey Dodge, Inc.,
a party to an arbitration agreement located in a contract for the sale of an automobile
claimed that he was not given information about arbitration prior to signing the
34. Id.
35. Id. at *4.
36. 988 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. App. 1999).
37. Id. at 393.
38. "This chapter applies only to the arbitration of a controversy between members of an association
or corporation that is: ... (2) incorporated under the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act .. " TEX. CIV.
PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 173.002 (West 1998).
39. D. Wilson Constr. Co., 988 S.W.2d at 394. The Texas Court of Appeals in Texarkana dealt with
the same issue two years earlier in Holk v. Biard, 920 S.W.2d 803, 807 (Tex. App. 1996).
40. D. Wilson Constr. Co., 988 S.W.2d at 394 (citing Holt, 920 S.W.2d at 807).
41. 952 P.2d 342 (Colo. 1998).
42. Id. at 343.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 344.
45. Id. at 342-50.
46. No. 97-6410, 1998 WL 826829, at *3 (10th Cir. Dec. 1, 1998).
[Vol. 1999, No. 2
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agreement and, therefore, the agreement was invalid."7 The Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that when a party signs an agreement that includes an arbitration
provision, a presumption is raised that the party has read and understands the
agreement and the party cannot claim thereafter that the arbitration clause was not
explained to him, and is bound by the agreement."8
While some jurisdictions require the trial court to make an initial determination
regarding the validity or invalidity of an arbitration agreement,49 the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine withheld any determination regarding an arbitration
agreement, where the factual issues fell within the purview of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission ("FERC"). In Ashburnham Municipal Light Plant v. Maine
Yankee Atomic Power Co.,s° a dispute arose between the secondary purchasers of a
power plant, and its primary owners .5  Because disputes in the regulated power
industry are at least under the primary, if not exclusive, jurisdiction of FERC the
court held that it could exercise its equitable powers to postpone any judicial
determination in the case until FERC had ruled on the case. 2 If FERC either
concluded it did not have jurisdiction, or failed to exercise it, the parties would be
allowed to return to the judicial system. 3
C. Is it an Arbitration Agreement?
In some situations, courts must determine if the agreement before them is
actually an agreement to arbitrate at all. In Minot Town & Country v. Fireman's
Fund Insurance Co.,' the Supreme Court of North Dakota analyzed an insurance
contract to determine if a provision providing for an appraisal qualified as an
agreement to arbitrate. 5 The insurance provision set up a procedure to resolve
disputes regarding the amount of damage suffered by the insured. 6 Each party was
to select an appraiser to determine the amount of damage. 7 The two appraisers were
also required to select a third party "umpire."5' After the appraisers made and signed
their assessment of damage, the insured moved for a judgment to vacate the
"arbitration" award, which was denied. 9 On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme
Court determined that the appraisal provision did not constitute an agreement to
arbitrate.' The supreme court noted general differences between an arbitration
47. Id. at *2.
48. Id. at *3.
49. Burke v. Wilkins, 507 S.E.2d 913 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that-the trial court's failure to
summarily determine the validity of the arbitration agreement was reversible error when the issue was
raised by the parties).
50. 721 A.2d 651 (Me. 1998).
51. Id. at 652-53.
52. Id. at 655.
53. Id. at 654.
54. 587 N.W.2d 189 (N.D. 1998).
55. Id.




60. Id. at 191.
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procedure and an appraisal." Specifically, arbitrations usually decide the entire
dispute, while appraisals deal solely with the amount of damage suffered.62 In the
instant case, the supreme court pointed out that the insurer reserved the right to deny
coverage, suggesting the appraisal was merely a determination of damage, and not
a binding decision regarding liability. 63 Therefore, the court held that the U.A.A. did
not apply to the provision.'
The court, in PHC, Inc. v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance
Co.,6 faced a similar appraisal procedure and reached the same result." The PHC
court focused on the lack of any mention of arbitrators or the U.A.A. in the
agreement and, like the court in Minot Town & Country, the North Carolina Court
of Appeals noted the reservation by the insurance company of the right to deny the
claim after the procedure is complete. 67 Based on this evidence, the court determined
that the agreement was merely for an appraisal of damage, and not an agreement to
arbitrate."
D. Does the UA.A. Apply?
Even once it is determined that a valid arbitration agreement exists, questions
may still remain regarding whether or not the U.A.A. applies to the particular
agreement. In particular, the Federal Arbitration Act ("F.A.A.") 69 provides for a
federal body of substantive law dealing with arbitration agreements. 7' The F.A.A.
does not, however, provide its own subject matter jurisdiction.7' Instead, the F.A.A.
is applied to cases dealing with arbitration that have already established federal
subject matter jurisdiction through diversity or federal question.72  If these
requirements are met, the court will apply the F.A.A. to the dispute regarding
arbitration.73
The parties may, however, prevent the application of the F.A.A. by specifying
in the arbitration agreement that the U.A.A. applies to arbitration issues. In UHC
Management Co., Inc. v. Computer Sciences Corp.,7' the Eighth Circuit declined an
invitation to apply the Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act in lieu of the F.A.A. 5
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 191.
64. Id. at 190.
65. 501 S.E.2d 701 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 703.
68. Id.
69. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1954).
70. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 n.32 (1983).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. For cases involving the use of the F.A.A. in lieu of state Uniform Arbitration Acts, see Harper v.
United Healthcare Corp., No. 97-C-4497, 1998 WL 673822 (N.D. I1l. Sept. 23, 1998); M.C. Constr.
Corp. v. Gray Co., 17 F. Supp.2d 541 (W.D. Va. 1998). In Harper, the district court noted that if the
F.A.A. did not apply, the Illinois U.A.A. might still apply to a proceeding to compel arbitration. Harper,
1998 WL 673822, at *3 n.3.
74. 148 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1998).
75. Id. at 997.
[Vol. 1999, No. 2
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However, the court stated that it would construe an arbitration agreement to require
application of the U.A.A. if the parties made their intent to do so "abundantly
clear. ' '76 The Eighth Circuit pointed out that the agreement in UHC made no
reference to Minnesota's Uniform Arbitration Act and, in fact, provided that
Minnesota law would yield whenever preempted by federal law.77 Based on these
facts, the court refused to preempt the F.A.A. in favor of Minnesota's U.A.A.78
Not only can the F.A.A. preempt the U.A.A., but the parties to an arbitration
agreement can also institute the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") rules in
place of the U.A.A. In Ratchye v. Lucas,79 the Supreme Court of Montana held that
a provision in an arbitration agreement providing that the Commercial Arbitration
Rules of the American Arbitration Association would be honored, despite a notice
on the front page of the agreement referring to Montana's U.A.A. 80 The supreme
court stated that the notice provision was designed merely to tell the parties that the
agreement contained an arbitration clause, and was not meant to impose the Montana
U.A.A. on the parties.8' The court held that the provision in the agreement expressly
providing for the use of the AAA rules in any arbitration proceeding was clear and
explicit, and could not be rendered void by applying the Montana U.A.A.82
III. SECTION 2: MOTION TO COMPEL OR STAY ARBITRATION
Section 2 of the U.A.A. provides that when a valid arbitration agreement is
found to exist between two parties and this agreement covers the dispute in question,
then a court must compel arbitration.13 If there is a dispute concerning the existence
of such an agreement, the court "shall proceed summarily to the determination of the
issue. ' ' u In such circumstances, when the agreement to arbitrate is in question, the
court may stay the arbitration proceeding.85
A. Existence of a Valid Arbitration Agreement
In Jenkins v. Percival,16 Jenkins made a motion to compel arbitration against
tort-feasor Gerald C. Percival ("Percival") and his insurance company, USF&G




79. 957 P.2d 1128 (Mont. 1998).
80. Id. at 1134.
81. Id. The Montana statute requiring the notice provision was repealed in 1997. Id.
82. The respondents in this case also argued that the Montana U.A.A. was more efficient and less
expensive than the AAA rules. The Montana Supreme Court stated that the relative efficiency of the
different rules was irrelevant, since the agreement explicitly stated which arbitration guidelines to follow.
Id.
83. U.A.A. § 2.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 962 P.2d 796 (Utah 1998).
87. Id. at 797.
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and the adjuster for USF&G an alleged agreement to arbitrate was established." As
the parties approached the agreed date of arbitration, however, USF&G's adjuster
revoked his offer to arbitrate. 9 The Third District Court of Salt Lake County denied
Jenkins' motion to compel arbitration on the basis that there was not a valid written
arbitration agreement." On appeal, the Supreme Court of Utah held that "until an
agreement to arbitrate is reduced to writing, it is invalid, unenforceable and
revocable."'"
In Burke v. Wilkins, 92 joint venturers entered into several agreements, each
containing a provision that called for arbitration in the case of disputes.93 Burke filed
a judicial action alleging "fraud, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and breach of
contract" against Wilkins.94 Pursuant to their arbitration agreement, Wilkins moved
to stay the judicial proceeding and compel arbitration. 95 Burke challenged the
motion to compel arbitration claiming that Wilkins' fraudulent actions rendered the
parties' contracts and, therefore, their arbitration agreements, void.96 The Superior
Court of Wake County denied the Wilkins' motion to compel arbitration without first
deciding if a valid arbitration agreement existed. 97 On appeal, the Court of Appeals
of North Carolina reversed and remanded to the superior court, holding that when
the existence of the agreement is disputed the court must "summarily determine
whether, as a matter of law, a valid arbitration agreement exists," before making a
ruling on a motion to compel arbitration.98
In AJM Packaging Corp. v. Crossland Construction Co., Inc.,99 AIM Packaging
Corporation ("AJM") brought a breach of contract and warranty action against
Crossland Construction Company ("Crossland"). 0° Following Crossland's motion
to compel arbitration, a hearing was held at the trial court level to determine if a
valid agreement to arbitrate existed.'O° Finding no such agreement, the Circuit Court
of Jasper County denied Crossland's motion to compel arbitration and Crossland
appealed.'0 2 The Missouri Court of Appeals held that although policies favor the
enforcement of arbitration, parties are only compelled to arbitrate when they in fact
have bargained for this arrangement.'0 3 The court of appeals stated that AJM did not
88. Id.
89. Id. at 798.
90. Id. Although the supreme court found that written correspondence between parties may qualify
as an agreement to arbitrate, the court failed to find evidence of a "meeting of the minds" between
Jenkins and USF&G contained within their written correspondence. Id. at 800.
91. Id. The Supreme Court of Utah, however, reversed and remanded this case to the trial court on
an alternative theory of contract enforcement outside the scope of the Utah Arbitration Act. Based on
an equitable theory of part performance, the trial court was instructed to determine whether an oral
agreement existed and whether either party had partially performed. Id. at 801.
92. 507 S.E.2d 913 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
93. Id. at 913.




98. Id. at 914 (citing Routh v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 400 S.E.2d 755, 757 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991)).
99. 962 S.W.2d 906 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
100. Id. at 907.
101. Id. at 907, 909.
102. Id. at 907.
103. Id. at 911.
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correctly establish the existence of such an agreement, and thus the motion to compel
arbitration was denied.' °4
In Bradford v. Denny's Inc.,'0 5 Cheryl Bradford ("Bradford") brought a personal
injury suit against Denny's Inc. ("Denny's") after eating food that contained a
staple.'O6 Bradford, however, voluntarily dismissed her suit against Denny's after
entering into an agreement to proceed with binding arbitration.'0 7 Following
arbitration, Denny's, claiming it had not been aware of the arbitration agreement
until the day before arbitration, disputed the validity of the arbitration agreement.,°s
Although Denny's did not raise an objection to the arbitration or raise the issue of
the validity of the agreement during or prior to the arbitration, it refused to pay the
arbitrator's award.'0 9 Bradford moved for summary judgement and sought
confirmation of the arbitrator's award." 0 Denny's responded with a motion to vacate
the award claiming that it did not enter into the arbitration agreement, hence the
agreement was not valid and the award was not enforceable."' Although Denny's
was not a signatory on the agreement to arbitrate, the Northern District of Illinois
held that Denny's was bound by the acts of its lawyer under the doctrine of apparent
authority and that Denny's failure to object to the arbitration ratified Eckardt's
signature of the agreement." 2 The court stated that because Denny's was held to the
action of its lawyer, the agreement to arbitrate was valid and the arbitrator's award
should be confirmed."
3
In Comverse Network Systems, Inc. v. Computel Computadores e
Telecommunicacoes, S.A., "' Comverse Network Systems, Inc. ("Comverse") and
Computel Computadores e Telecommunicacoes ("Computel") disputed the forum
in which to compel arbitration."' Computel and Comverse (known as BTI when the
facts arose) entered into a "Master Distribution Agreement" ("MDA")." 6 The MDA
104. Id. at 910. The court also commented that even if AJM had established the existence of the
provision containing the agreement to arbitrate, the rules of contract interpretation would prevent them
from upholding AJM's motion to compel arbitration. Id. at 911-12. The court stated that an arbitration
agreement, like a contract, must be construed as a whole such that none of the terms are rendered
meaningless. Id. at 912. The court concluded that the contract entered into between AJM and Crossland
contained sections that expressly called for the adjudication of disputes and thus would have superseded
the provision containing the arbitration agreement. Id. at 911-12.
105. Bradford v. Denny's Inc., No. 97 C 1531, 1998 WL 312009 (N.D. Ill. June 4, 1998).
106. Id. at *1.
107. Id. Although Denny's itself was not a signatory to the agreement, Denny's counsel did sign the
arbitration agreement. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at *2.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at *4-5. The court found that Eckardt was in fact Denny's legal counsel in the matter, that
Bradford reasonably believed that Eckardt had the authority to enter into a binding agreement, and that
Bradford, through her voluntary dismissal of the case, relied to her detriment on Eckardt's authority.
Id. at *4. As well, Denny's failed to establish evidence to rebut the presumption that a lawyer has
authority to act for her client and that Denny's is responsible for the actions of its own counsel. Id. The
court noted, however, that Denny's does have a potential cause of action against Eckardt. Id. at *5.
113. Id. at *6.
114. No. CIV. A. 98-1155, 1998 WL 448910 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 13, 1998).
115. Id. at *3.
116. Id. at *1.
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regulated the distribution, maintenance and warranty of BTI's communications
products by Computel in Brazil. 117 The MDA also provided for arbitration before
the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") of disputes arising out the
agreement." 8 After several years of successful business relations, Computel and BTI
became partners in a joint venture and entered into the "Joint Venture Agreement"
("JVA").119 The JVA provided for submission of disputes before the International
Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"). 2 0
Two years later, BTI made arrangements for a merger with another company,
Comverse, that would violate the provisions of the IVA entered into with
Computel. 2 ' Without disclosing the intended merger with Comverse, BTI induced
Computel to dissolve their joint venture.' 22 Computel and BTI signed the Purchase
and Sale Agreement ("PSA"), thus dissolving their joint venture and re-assigning
their "rights and duties" to the previously entered into MDA.12 The PSA, however,
did not explicitly provide for arbitration of disputes.'24
Computel then brought a breach of warranty and contract action against the now
merged BTI and Comverse (renamed Comverse). 25 Computel alleged that because
it was fraudulently induced to sign the PSA, the JVA should still govern their
relationship with Comverse1 26 Thus, their dispute should be placed before the
ICC.1 27 The Superior Court of Massachusetts concluded that because they had
preliminarily decided that the JVA had been terminated and because Computel's
claims related to the MDA, the MDA would governm2 Thus, pursuant to the MDA,
the parties' disputes were compelled to arbitration.
29
B. Parties Rights Pursuant to a Valid Arbitration Agreement
As illustrated in Denny's, the validity of an agreement may hinge on who has
the authority to enter into such an agreement. 30 In Jenkins v. Percival, 13' an alleged
oral agreement to arbitrate was entered into by Jenkins and an insurance adjuster for
USF&G. 3 2 USF&G asserted that the agreement to arbitrate was invalid because its
adjuster lacked the authority to bind USF&G to an arbitration agreement. 3 3 The








125. Id. at *3.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at *3-4.
129. Id. For these same reasons, Computel's claim filed against Comverse in Brazil was also
compelled to arbitration before the AAA. Id. at *5.
130. See supra Part III.A.
131. 962 P.2d 796 (Utah 1998). See supra Part I11.A for a brief discussion of validity of an oral
agreement to arbitrate.
132. Jenkins, 962 P.2d at 797.
133. Id. at 798.
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Supreme Court of Utah held that an insurance company's adjuster, given the power
to enter into settlement discussions and decisions, has the authority to bind the
insurance company to arbitration agreements." This authority, however, is limited
in that the adjuster can not expose the insured to liability that exceeds the limits of
the insurance policy. 3 '
In addition to disputes concerning who is bound by a valid arbitration
agreement, parties also disagree as to who may enforce the arbitration agreement.
In Goldstein v. Depository Trust Co., 3 6 Goldstein represented plaintiffs in a class
action suit against Depository Trust Company ("DTC") alleging negligence and
breach of fiduciary duty.' 3  DTC compelled arbitration of the class action
proceeding based on an arbitration agreement entered into by Goldstein and his
individual broker, Prudential Bache Securities.13 On appeal, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania noted that the class action suit was based on the alleged fraudulent
actions of DTC specifically. 3 9 The stockholders' claim did not implicate their
individual banks or brokers through which they made the transaction.'" Therefore,
the agreement entered into by Goldstein and Prudential-Bache was not relevant to
the claim against DTC.14' As well, the court noted that DTC was not a party to the
arbitration agreement and therefore may not rely on the agreement to compel
arbitration.
42
In Township of Sugarloaf v. Bowling,4 4 Bowling, a former part-time police
officer, was employed by the Township of Sugarloaf ("Sugarloaf') "on a
probationary basis."'"4 Bowling sought arbitration following notice that Sugarloaf
would not be hiring him as a full-time police officer. 4 Bowling made his motion
to compel arbitration pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement governing the
relationship between Sugarloaf and the police department.'" Although Bowling was
informed he was not covered by the collective bargaining agreement as a part-time
employee, Bowling maintained his action.147 Sugarloaf then filed a complaint for
134. Id. at 798-99.
135. Id. at 799. The court also noted that an individual may independently agree to waive "his or her
right of access to the courts." Id.
136. 717 A.2d 1063 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
137. Id. at 1063-64.
138. Id. at 1066.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1067. The court remarked that DTC also failed to produce a signed copy of the alleged
arbitration agreement between Goldstein and Prudential-Bache. The court noted that even if DTC were
able to compel arbitration pursuant to this particular arbitration agreement, failure to produce a signed
copy of the agreement made it impossible for DTC to establish the existence of a valid agreement and
that the claim fell within the scope of the agreement. Hence, the motion to compel arbitration would be
denied. Id.
142. Id. DTC relied on F.A.A. cases that did allow individuals who were not party to an arbitration
agreement to enforce the agreement. This court, however, was not bound by the aforementioned cases
and was able to factually distinguish DTC from these cases. Id.
143. 722 A.2d 246 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998), appeal granted, No. 0092 M.D. Alloc. Dkt. 1999, 1999
WL 556823 (Pa. July 28, 1999).
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injunctive relief and/or a stay of arbitration in the Common Pleas Court of Lazerence
County, and sought a determination on the question of whether Bowling was entitled
to arbitrate the matter of his dismissal."'
The court of common pleas, referring to the Uniform Arbitration Act, granted
Sugarloafs injunction, stating that Bowling's probationary status removed him from
coverage of the collective bargaining agreement.' 49 Bowling appealed the order
contending the collective bargaining agreement specifically called for arbitration of
employment matters and was therefore in conflict with the U.A.A.' s In instances
in which the U.A.A. is in conflict with the collective bargaining agreement, the court
previously held that "the arbitrator has sole jurisdiction in the first instance to decide
whether an issue is arbitrable...... Therefore, Bowling asserted that an arbitrator
should decide the arbitrability of his claim." 2
On appeal, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held that before deciding
whether arbitration is required it must establish that Bowling was covered by the
collective bargaining agreement; if he was not covered by the agreement, due to his
probationary status, then the court would, in fact, have jurisdiction to stay the
arbitration.' If however, Bowling was covered by the collective bargaining
agreement, although in conflict with the authority of the U.A.A., the issue would
proceed to arbitration.1 4 The court ultimately remanded the issue to the court of
common pleas for further consideration.'
C. Does the Dispute Fall Within the
Scope of the Arbitration Agreement?
In Brennan v. King,'16 Brennan, a university professor, brought charges of
discrimination and breach of contract against his employer university following
denial of tenure.'57 The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
refused to hear Brennan's allegation stating that he failed to follow the appropriate
grievance procedures, specifically arbitration, before seeking judicial remedies. 5
Brennan appealed contending that the district court erred in finding that the
university's appeal procedure required him to arbitrate his dispute. 5 9 The court
evaluated whether Brennan was required to arbitrate his dispute under the
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 248.
151. Id. (citing Chester Upland Sch. Dist. v. McLaughlin, 655 A.2d 621 (Pa. Commnw. Ct. 1995),
aff'd, 675 A.2d 1211 (Pa. 1996)).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 249.
154. Id.
155. Id. The Commonwealth court, based on logic rather than presented evidence, did determine that
a "probationary officer is not subject to the protections of a collective bargaining agreement." Id. Given
the length of Bowling's probationary employment, however, this is an issue for the court to decide. Id.
156. 139 F.3d 258 (1st Cir. 1998).
157. Id. at 259.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 258-60.
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university's established grievance system using both the F.A.A. and the U.A.A.' 6
Under the U.A.A., using rules of contract interpretation, a presumption of
arbitrability may be overcome "by a showing that the particular dispute at issue is
not subject to arbitration by the terms of the agreement."' 6' The court found that the
university procedures for arbitration of a claim involving discrimination did not
require arbitration.'62
First, only procedural aspects of a complaint were subject to binding
arbitration.' Second, if one were to submit a grievance to arbitration, the
arbitrator's decision would only be binding to the extent that the university president
would take it into consideration.' 6' Finally, the court found that arbitration is an
employee's right, rather than an obligation. 65 Although the court indicated that it
would resolve doubts in favor of arbitration, the evidence presented in this case was
strong enough to overcome the presumption of arbitrability.'6
In Ottman v. Fadden,'67 Ottian brought a defamation and libel claim against
Fadden, his former employer. 68  The allegation stemmed from an interoffice
memorandum sent by Fadden following Ottman's voluntary resignation from
Hanover. 6 9 Fadden compelled arbitration pursuant to the provision contained in
Ottman's securities industry registration contract. 70 The provision provided for the
arbitration of disputes "arising out of the employment or termination of
employment."'' Ottman claimed that because the defamatory information had little
relationship to his employment, it did not fall under the scope of the arbitration
agreement.7 2  The District Court of Hennepin County found that the alleged
defamatory claims were sufficiently connected to Ottman's employment and
therefore granted Fadden's motion to compel arbitration. 7 1 Ottman appealed the
district court's decision.'74 The Court of Appeals of Minnesota reminded the parties
that although there is a policy favoring enforcement of arbitration and that
interpretive doubts would be resolved in favor of arbitration, parties were only bound
to arbitrate that to which they contractually agreed. ' Given that the memorandum
in question contained information concerning Ottman's resignation, customers, and
160. Id. at 264-67.
161. Id. at 267.
162. Id. at 266.
163. Id. at 265.
164. Id. at 265-66.
165. Id. at 266.
166. Id. at 267. See also Grohn v. Sisters of Charity Serv. of Colo., 960 P.2d 722 (Colo. Ct. App.
1998) (interpreting the scope of an employer's agreement to arbitrate within the guidelines of the
F.A.A.).
167. 575 N.W.2d 593 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
168. Id. at 594.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 595.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 594.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 595.
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accounts, the court of appeals determined that the dispute fell under the scope of the
agreement to arbitrate.1
76
After finding a valid arbitration agreement and that the dispute is covered by the
agreement, the court may not always choose to compel arbitration. In Ashburnham
Municipal Light Plant v. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co., '" the Superior Court of
Maine denied Ashburnham's motion to compel arbitration, without prejudice. 178 The
court held that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") needs to first
decide if it has jurisdiction over the dispute. '9 Ashburnham appealed, claiming that
once a court has determined that a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, it must compel
arbitration. 80 On appeal, the court concluded that given the unique factual situation,
it would behoove the court to first let FERC determine the matter of jurisdiction and
then,' if necessary, the court would address the issue of arbitrability."' The court
noted that deference to an administrative agency was appropriate in situations where
it may have exclusive or primary jurisdiction.'83
In Board of Managers of the Courtyards at the Woodlands Condominium Ass 'n
v. IKO Chicago, Inc.,'"4 the Board of Managers of the Courtyards at the Woodlands
Condominium Association ("Woodland") brought a claim against Zale Groves, Inc.,
Zale Group, Inc., Zale Enterprise, Inc., and Zale Construction Comany (collectively
"Zale") alleging a defect in the construction work completed by Zale for
Woodland. 5 Zale, in turn, filed a third-party action against Johnston Associates
("Johnston") for the "architectural and design services," which it did on the allegedly
faulty roofs.'8 6 Zale and Johnston's contract for the Woodland's roofing project
contained an arbitration clause.8 7 Pursuant to the agreement, Johnston moved to
compel arbitration and stay the third-party claim.' 8 The trial court found a valid
arbitration agreement, but denied Johnston's motion to compel based on the fact the
Johnston was so "interconnected" with the litigation. 9 The appellate court affirmned
the trial court.' 90 The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed. 9' Although there is a
general policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements, both the trial and
176. Id. at 596.
177. 721 A.2d 651 (Me. 1998).
178. Id. at 652. Denial of the motion to compel arbitration without prejudice has the effect of staying
the arbitration. Id. at 654.
179. Id. at 652. The court noted that FERC may have primary or exclusive jurisdiction of this matter
as the facts centered on a utility purchase. Id. at 654. "FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over the
reasonableness of interstate whole sale rates for electricity." Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (1983)).
180. Id. at 652.
181. Id. at 655.
182. Id. at 654. "State courts are completely preempted from acting within areas of FERC's exclusive
jurisidction." Id.
183. Id. See also Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Sys. Corp., 971 P.2d 1240 (Mont. 1998).
184. 697 N.E.2d 727 (111. 1998).





190. Id. at 728.
191. Id.
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appellate courts relied on the exception to this rule created by J.F. Inc. v. Vicik. 192
Johnston appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois asserting that the Vicik exception
had been criticized and that the policy behind Vicik was not strong enough to
supercede the general policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements.1
93
Although the supreme court recognized "policies supporting joinder and the
resolution of multiparty conflicts in a single forum," it overruled Vicik and held that
once a valid arbitration agreement has been established, the arbitration agreement
should be enforced. 94 The supreme court found that the parties bargained for the
right to arbitrate their disputes and that to deny a motion to compel in multi-party
litigation would render entrance into arbitration agreements meaningless. 9 '
D. Motion to Stay Arbitration
In O'Brien v. Hanover Insurance Co., " O'Brien, former president of Hanover
Insurance Company ("Hanover"), entered into a dispute concerning violation of his
severance agreement with Hanover.'97 The arbitration provision in the severance
agreement compelled the parties to arbitrate their dispute. 9 Shortly thereafter,
Hanover filed charges against O'Brien.'" Following the initiation of the judicial
action, the arbitration panel stayed further arbitration proceedings until the potential
for conflict with the Superior Court of Massachusetts was no longer at issue.200 After
completion of the litigation, the parties resumed their discussion of arbitration.20'
Pursuant to the agreements reached during these discussion, O'Brien filed for a stay
of arbitration and Hanover appealed.2 2 On appeal, the supreme court stated that,
"we [the court] have not determined whether a court may stay arbitration on the
ground that a previous court decision on an issue bars subsequent arbitration of that
11203issue.
192. 426 N.E.2d 257 (I11. App. Ct. 1981).
Accordingly, the Vicik court specified that arbitration may be enjoined in multiparty
litigation under "strictly limited circumstances": "Where an arbitration agreement involves
some, but not all, of the parties to multiparty litigation, the policy favoring arbitration must
be weighed against the policies favoring joinder of claims. Where arbitration would
increase rather than decrease delay, complexity and costs, it should not receive favored
treatment."
Woodlands Condominium Ass 'n, 697 N.E.2d at 730.
193. Woodlands Condominium Ass 'n, 697 N.E.2d at 729.
194. Id. at 730-31.
195. Id. at 731-32.
196. 692 N.E.2d 39 (Mass. 1998).





202. Id. at 42.
203. Id. at 43. The supreme court also found that the court, rather than the arbitrator, is the
appropriate body to decide when a waiver has occurred. The question of waiver, like the question of
validity and enforceability, must be determined summarily rather than waiting for a final judgment in
pending litigation. Id. at 42-44.
1999]
15
Hunt et al.: Hunt: Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
IV. SECTION 3: APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATORS BY THE COURT
In State ex rel. Telecom Management, Inc. v. O'Mally,204 the Western District
of the Missouri Court of Appeals held that section 3 of the Missouri U.A.A. applies
when the arbitration agreement has no provision for selecting replacement
arbitrators. 0 5 Even though the agreement in this case provided a method for
selecting the arbitrators, the appellants claimed that the arbitrators were biased and,
therefore, could not perform their duties.20' The appellants reasoned, section 3
should kick in, allowing the court to select new arbitrators. However, the Western
District noted that courts should refrain from interfering in the arbitration process
prior to an award unless it is an extreme case.20 7 Finding no facts suggesting bias in
the case, the court held that the replacement of arbitrators for bias could not be
addressed until an award was presented to the court.08
V. SECTION 7: WITNESSES, SUBPOENAS, DEPOSITIONS
Section 7 of the U.A.A. outlines the general discovery powers of an arbitrator."
In Palmer v. Duke Power Co.,210 the defendant in an arbitration proceeding sought
to have the judgment vacated because the arbitrator refused to enforce the
defendant's request for certain medical documents belonging to the plaintiff.21 The
North Carolina Court of Appeals noted that section 7 provides the arbitrator with




Therefore, the court found no abuse of discretion on the part of the arbitrator, and
denied the defendant's motion to vacate. 3
In UE Local 893/Iowa United Professionals v. Schmit, 214 the Iowa Supreme
Court held that section 7 does not make a distinction between public and private
sector arbitrations."' The case involved a collective bargaining agreement between
the State of Iowa and UE Local 893 ("Union"). Union requested the arbitrator to
issue a subpoenas duces tecum to two department employees for the State of Iowa. 6
Iowa resisted the subpoenas, claiming the arbitrator had no authority over public
sector parties.21 7 The district court agreed, but was reversed by the Iowa Supreme
Court. The Iowa Supreme Court held that because no distinction between private
204. 965 S.W.2d 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).




209. U.A.A. § 7.
210. 499 S.E.2d 801 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
211. Id. at 803.
212. Id. at 804 (citing Prime S. Homes, Inc. v. Byrd, 401 S.E.2d 822 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991)).
213. Id. at 806.
214. 576 N.W.2d 357 (Iowa 1998).
215. Id. at 362.
216. Id. at 358-59.
217. Id.
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and public parties existed in section 7, arbitrators of public sector disputes have the
authority to issue subpoenas. 8
VI. SECTION 10: FEES AND EXPENSES OF ARBITRATION
Absent a contrary provision in an arbitration agreement, section 10 provides that
all fees and expenses incurred through the process of arbitration (except attorneys'
fees), shall be administered to the parties through the arbitrator's award.219 Because
section 10 addresses attorneys' fees, the Maryland Court of Appeals held in Blitz v.
Beth Isaac Adas Israel Congregation,22 ° that language found in section 14 of the
U.A.A. referring to "costs and disbursements" did not pertain to the award of
attorney's fees.22'
While section 10 places authority to disburse arbitration fees in the arbitrator,
the parties can agree to allow a trial court to essentially act as the arbitrator regarding
this issue.222 In Dansereau v. Ulmer,223 the Alaska Supreme Court held that the
standard of appellate review of an award administered by a trial judge acting as an
arbitrator will not be same as that which is applied to arbitration awards under the
U.A.A.2 4 The court did suggest, however, that with "thorough briefing and careful
consideration," the court might apply the U.A.A. standard, but the present case did
not warrant this standard.225
VII. SECTION 11: CONFIRMATION OF AN AWARD
Section 11 of the U.A.A. governs confirmation of an arbitrator's award and
speaks to the limited role of judicial review.226 Section 1 1 states that "the court shall
confirm an award" unless the timely application by a party has brought about "the
vacation, modification or correction of an award."227  Given the guidelines
established in section 11, courts discussion of whether to confirm an award often
focus on whether grounds to proceed under section 12 (vacation) or section 13
218. Id. However, in Michigan State Employees Ass'n v. Michigan Liquor Control Commission, 591
N.W.2d 42 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998); the court held that a collective bargaining agreement that provided
for the arbitration to be dictated by the rules of the AAA preempted section 7 of the U.A.A. Therefore,
the arbitrator did not possess the legal authority to issue subpoenas under the agreement. Id. at 43-44.
219. U.A.A. § 10.
220. 720 A.2d 912 (Md. 1998).
221. Id. at 915.
222. 955 P.2d 916. (Ark. 1998).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 918 n.2.
225. Id.
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(modification or correction) are met.22 Other cases, however, focus on the
procedural aspects of a motion to confirm an arbitration award.
In Kutch v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,2 29 Kutch and State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm") disputed the amount
of damages owed to Kutch following an automobile accident with an uninsured
motorist.230 Kutch's uninsured motorist policy had a limit of $100,000.2" After
submission of the dispute to arbitration, the arbitrator awarded Kutch $176,800.f2
During the arbitration, neither party mentioned the policy limit or offered a copy of
the insurance policy explaining the $100,000 limit. 233 Approximately one month
after issuance of the award, Kutch's attorney sent State Farm a letter offering to
lower the amount due to $100,000 (plus interest) if the demand was paid within
seven days.234
One month later, State Farm executed a check, but in accordance with the time
constraint demand letter sent, Kutch refused to acknowledge the check and sought
confirmation of the entire amount awarded by the arbitrator.235 State Farm asserted
the uninsured motorist policy limit as a defense to payment of the arbitrator's
award.2 6 The Denver District Court confirmed the arbitrator's amount even though
it went beyond the policy limit because State Farm failed to vacate or modify the
award within the ninety-day time limit.237 The court of appeals reversed the trial
court's holding that the policy limit defense did not need to be raised during a
motion to vacate, modify or correct the award, because it was not presented or
required to be presented during the original arbitration. Thus, the policy limit
defense could now be raised."'
The Supreme Court of Colorado granted certiorari to consider the limits on
judicial confirmation of an arbitrator's award.239 The supreme court found that
because the Uniform Arbitration Act provided an explicit and thorough set of
procedures for the appeal of an arbitrator's award, State Farm should have utilized
these opportunities within the time limit provided.240 Because State Farm failed to
challenge the award in the manner provided in the U.A.A., it was time-barred from
228. See New England Utils. v. Hydro-Quebec, 10 F. Supp.2d 53 (D. Mass. 1998); Reading v.
Wheelabrator Water Tech., Inc., No. CIV.A. 97-7799, 1998 WL 151022 (E.D. Penn. Mar. 31, 1998);
Maiocco v. Greenway Capital Corp., No. CIV.A. 97-MC-0053, 1998 WL 48557 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 1998);
E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Custom Blending Int'l Inc., No. C.A. 16295-NC, 1998 WL 842289
(Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 1998); Sun Co., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 708 A.2d 875 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1998).
229. 960 P.2d 93 (Colo. 1998) (en bane).







237. Id. at 95-96.
238. Id. at 96.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 97.
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raising the limit of Kutch's uninsured motored policy as a defense.24' The Supreme
Court of Colorado remarked that "[w]hile preventing State Farm from raising the
policy limit defense may seem inequitable on the facts of this case, the result we
reach is necessary in order to preserve the integrity of the U.A.A.'s statutory
framework.
'242
In Fisher v. National General Insurance Co.,2"3 the Superior Court of Navajo
County found that a request for confirmation of arbitrator's award was untimely.2"
Although no explicit time limit is set by the U.A.A. for confirmation of an award,
the trial court created a time limit of not more than ninety days.245 The Court of
Appeals of Arizona, however, applying principles of statutory interpretation,
reversed the trial court's decision holding that because there are other specific
timelines set in the U.A.A., the drafters must have intended this particular provision
not to have a deadline.2' Therefore, the request to confirm, although made in excess
of ninety days, was timely.
247
In McKibben v. Grigg,2" a dispute concerning the terms of a partnership
agreement led the parties to voluntary arbitration. 249 Displeased with the arbitrator's
result, McKibben made a motion to vacate the arbitrator's award and Grigg
responded with a motion to confirm the award. 250 The North Dakota Court of
Appeals acknowledged that judicial review of an arbitrator's award is limited. 21 The
court noted that it does not have the discretion to vacate or refuse to confirm an
award simply because it would not, or could not, have granted relief similar to that
chosen by the arbitrator.2 2 Because there was no basis offered to vacate or modify
the arbitrator's award, the court of appeals confirmed the amount. 253 The court
concluded that once an agreement was made to submit to arbitration, that measure
would be binding and, absent some reason to do otherwise, a court will confirm an
arbitrator's award.
25 4
241. Id. State Farm argued that the policy limit defense did not fit within the requirements for
modification, vacation or correction of an award, and thus could not raise the defense. Although the
Court of Appeals of Colorado agreed with their rationale, the Supreme Court of Colorado found that the
policy limit defense could have been used in a motion to modify or vacate the award. Id. at 98.
242. Id. at 99.
243. 965 P.2d 100 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998).
244. Id. at 102.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 103.
247. Id.
248. 582 N.W.2d 669 (N.D. Ct. App. 1998).




253. Id. at 674.
254. Id. at 671.
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VIII. SECTION 12: VACATING AN AWARD
The party challenging an arbitration award has the burden of showing grounds
to vacate the decision.255 The allegations must be among those contained in the
statute to vacate an award."6 Many states require a showing of fraudulent, irregular,
or partial conduct on the part of arbitrators to vacate a statutory arbitration award.
257
A. Procurement of Award by Corruption,
Fraud or Other Undue Means
In Wojdak v. Greater Philadelphia Cablevision, Inc., 218 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court and ruled that the U.A.A.
definition of "undue means" included an arbitrator engaging in ex parte
communications with third parties. 2" 9 A partnership agreement between the limited
and general partners of Cablevision required the purchasing of certain interests by
the general partners, the price being set by agreement of the parties, or otherwise by
the fair market value of the interest."6 In accordance with the agreement, an
appraiser would first consult the general partners to determine the purchase price.26'
If an agreement is not reached, the appraiser obtains from both the limited and
general partners a price for which they would be willing to sell and purchase,
respectively, and makes a final determination.262
Without the knowledge or participation of the parties, the appraiser consulted
an outside source in evaluating the interest of the partnership for sale.263 The
Pennsylvani a Supreme Court ruled that consulting a source outside those agreed
upon by the parties deprived the limited partners of the right to challenge the
assumptions and opinions of those upon whom the arbitrator relied.26 Because such
activity is considered "undue means," the court vacated the award.265 It should be
noted, however, that the court recognized-the "undue means" standard to be a high
threshold, requiring an arbitrator's decision to be "obtained in some manner which
was unfair and beyond the normal process contemplated by the arbitration act.,
266
255. Fisher v. National Gen. Ins. Co., 965 P.2d 100, 103 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998).
256. Id. (denying motion to vacate where party failed to demonstrate any of the statutory factors and
in addition, did not even argue them). See U.A.A. § 12.
257. See Sun Co., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 708 A.2d 875 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998)
(stating that because award may not be vacated based on errors of law allegedly committed by the
arbitration panel, the admission of parol evidence to interpret a contract will not be second guessed).
258. 707 A.2d 214 (Pa. 1998).
259. Id. at 223.
260. Id. at 215.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 217.
264. Id. at 223.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 221 (quoting Seither & Cherry Co. v. Illinois Bank Bldg. Corp., 419 N.E.2d 940, 945 (II1.
App. Ct. 1981)).
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B. Arbitrator Partiality, Misconduct and Bias
In Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Schwartz,267 the defendant stock broker
("Schwartz") entered into an oral agreement with the plaintiff employer ("Jones")
which stated that no other broker would have the rights to solicit clients within a
certain geographic proximity to the defendant.26" Sometime later, Jones told
Schwartz of their intention to station another broker in a nearby town, in violation
of the oral agreement. 26 9 Schwartz decided to resign from his employment.2 ° In
turn, Jones commenced an action against Schwartz, seeking a restraining order to
keep him from using company trade secrets and soliciting sales from any of Jones'
customers.27' In response to this suit, Schwartz commenced an action against Jones
alleging that they interfered with his contract to work for the plaintiff and damaged
his reputation in the community.
272
An arbitration panel found in favor of Schwartz. 273 Following this decision,
Jones filed an application to vacate the award on the grounds that the arbitrators
exceeded their powers, that the award was in manifest disregard of the law, and that
the panel was tainted with bias towards Jones.2 74 The court held that arbitrators
exceed their powers only when they decide a matter beyond the scope of the
arbitration agreement or rule on an issue that was clearly not submitted to them.27 5
Since the award here pertained to the employment agreement between the parties,
the arbitrators acted appropriately. 276 The court stated that bias or interest by
arbitrators must be "direct, definite and capable of demonstration, rather than remote,
uncertain or speculative," in order to vacate an award.2 77 The court also found that
Missouri's version of the Uniform Arbitration Act did not authorize vacating an
award because it was in manifest disregard of the law.278 Finally, the court found
that an arbitrator was not biased against Jones even though the arbitrator's spouse
was a broker employed by a competitor of Jones. 279 The fact that the arbitrator
disclosed this conflict to Jones, and that there was no evidence displaying a lack of
partiality in the arbitrator's questioning made such a bias claim futile.28 0
In Maiocco v. Greenway Capital Corp.,28' plaintiffs ("Maiocco"), who were two
clients of the defendant investment company ("Greenway"), alleged that a stock
broker employed by Greenway had engaged in speculative trading on their
267. 969 S.W.2d 788 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
268. Id. at 791.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 791-92.
272. Id. at 792.
273. Id. at 792-93.
274. Id. at 794-95.
275. Id. at 794.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 796 (quoting National Ave. Bldg. Co. v. Stewart, 910 S.W.2d 334, 343 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995)).
278. Id. at 794-95.
279. Id. at 795-96.
280. Id. at 796.
281. No. CIV.A. 97-MC-0053, 1998 WL 48557 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 1998).
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accounts. 2 The "Brokers Agreement" between the parties provided for arbitration
before the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") of all disputes
related to securities transactions."' Greenway claimed that they had nothing to do
with the stock broker's transactions on the Maiocco's accounts, and that the plaintiffs
executed a power of attomey in favor of the stock broker, thus releasing the
defendant from any responsibility. 2" The NASD ruled in favor of the Maioccos and
Greenway filed a petition to vacate the award. 2 5 The Maioccos made a motion to
confirm the award and the Pennsylvania District Court sought to combine the
216issues.
Greenway argued that the arbitrators engaged in misconduct during the
proceedings, leading to an unjust reward.8 7 Specifically, defendant alleged improper
refusal to postpone the hearing based on their need to call a key rebuttal witness and
failure to stop the hearing when defendant's counsel requested a short break.2 8'
Also, Greenway asserted that the arbitrators improperly refused to hear certain
evidence and prevented defendant from cross-examining a witness.289
The Pennsylvania District Court first focused on the choice of law provision in
the Brokers Agreement, which required following the Massachusetts Uniform
Arbitration Act.29 However, the time limitations specified in the Act were
considered procedural at the time the Brokers Agreement was drafted and, under the
Erie doctrine,29' must yield to the procedural rules under federal arbitration
statutes.292 Thus, a party had ninety days to file a motion to vacate after the-award
was delivered.
29 3
The court found a reasonable basis in the arbitrator's decision to refuse to
postpone the hearing in that Greenway failed to notify the panel of its desire to call
a rebuttal witness until the last day of the hearing.2 94 Such short notice interfered
with the set schedule of the arbitration and the award could not be vacated because
of Greenway's poor judgement.2 95 The court also found the panel's refusal to grant
unscheduled breaks during the arbitration was not an abuse of discretion and did not
create any prejudice. 2'
In refusing to hear evidence, the court reiterated the rule that every failure to
receive relevant evidence does not give rise to misconduct on the level of vacating
an award.297 The arbitrators were found to agree on admissibility when part of the
282. Id. at *1.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at *1-2.




290. Id. at *4. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 251, § 12 (1972).
291. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
292. Maiocco, 1998 WL 48557, at *5. See U.A.A. § 12.
293. U.A.A. § 12.
294. Maiocco, 1998 WL 48557, at *6.
295. Id.
296. Id. at *7.
297. Id.
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panel silently assented to the evidence. 29' Greenway also claimed that a witness'
telephone testimony prevented proper cross-examination of the witness, but the court
ruled that defendants could have faxed questions to the witness and the arbitrators
had the ability to assess credibility of testimony over the phone.299
Finally, the court stated that the panel had the right to ask questions during
defense council's closing argument and that arbitrators were not required to read any
written submissions by the parties.00 These actions by the panel did not warrant a
finding of misconduct that would justify vacating an award.0 1
C. Arbitrator Exceeding the Scope ofAuthority
Courts will often look to whether an arbitration award draws its essence from
the contract it is interpreting in deciding whether arbitrators exceeded their
powers.30 2 In City of Philadelphia v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5, the
city entered into a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with the police force
regarding their employment.3 3 Specifically, members of the Philadelphia Sheriff's
Department were to be paid overtime for any weekends they worked for the city.3°
The terms of the agreement were followed for months until the city unilaterally
decided to stop paying the officers overtime pay. 03 After the workers filed a
grievance, an arbitrator ruled that the city violated specific terms of the CBA and
was required to both cease from denying the officers overtime pay and compensate
them for lost back pay.a°
In reviewing the action, the court looked to the "essence test" to determine
whether the arbitrator's decision "could rationally be derived from the [CBA]. 3 °7
Such an interpretation of the CBA by the arbitrator cannot be manifestly
unreasonable or "exhibit an infidelity to the agreement.""3 The court held that the
arbitrator's decision was reasonable because the CBA explicitly called for overtime
pay under these conditions, and the city did in fact comply with the requirements
before amending the agreement without the permission of the police department.3' 9
The court acknowledged that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had granted
arbitrators broad discretion in creating remedies.3'0 Therefore, the court ruled that
it had no authority to vacate the honest judgement of the arbitrator in that respect.31'
298. Id. at *8.
299. Id.
300. Id. at *10. See Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 11 n.8 (1st Cir. 1990).
301. Maiocco, 1998 WL 48557, at *10.
302. City of Philadelphia v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5, 720 A.2d 811, 814 (Pa. Corrunw.
Ct. 1998).
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In Jupiter Aluminum Corp. v. Home Insurance Co.,3" the plaintiff asked for
vacation of an arbitration award interpreting an insurance policy because they did
not understand that such a determination would be binding.3 ' This issue arose after
both parties agreed to participate in proceedings where they would submit appraisal
reports to an umpire who would determine the proper insurance coverage owed by
the defendant.3 14 However, the court did not reach the merits of plaintiff's motion
to vacate as defendants were given leave to file a counterclaim."' 5
An arbitrator is "bound to follow the guidelines set forth in the four comers" of
a contract to arbitrate in order to avoid exceeding their scope of authority.3 6 In
Michigan State Employees Ass 'n v. Michigan Liquor Control Commission,317 the
court held that arbitrators exceeded their powers under the parties' CBA by issuing
subpoenas without any legal authorization. 31 8 The court noted that although the
American Arbitration Association ("AAA") rules provide for subpoena power for
arbitrators, such power must be "authorized by law. '319 In this case, the parties
contract language did not give the arbitrator the power to issue subpoenas without
court authorization. 32' Furthermore, even though the F.A.A. and Michigan statutes
may provide subpoena authority in some arbitration proceedings, "they do not
provide that authority for [CBA] arbitration. 321
In Father & Sons, Inc. v. Taylor,322 the defendants ("Taylors") entered into a
construction contract with the plaintiffs ("F&S") to build a room addition onto the
Taylors' home.323 The contract contained an agreement to arbitrate provision.324
F&S failed to complete their work in accordance with the contract and the parties
decided to draft a second contract, leading to this dispute.325 F&S subsequently filed
separate complaints in three different courts, alleging the Taylors had not paid the
balance due under the new contract. 326 F&S then voluntarily dismissed the
complaint filed in the first court and filed an amended complaint in the second
court.327 The Taylors responded with a counterclaim revolving around F&S's failure
to complete the contract as required.3 28 The court dismissed F&S's complaint and
F&S moved to compel arbitration of the Taylors' counterclaim and other pending
matters.329
312. 181 F.R.D. 605 (N.D. 111. 1998).
313. Id. at 606.
314. Id. at 607.315. Id. at 609.
316. Beattie v. Autostyle Plastics, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 181,183 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996)
317. 591 N.W.2d 42 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
318. Id. at 43.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.1 (1995); MIt-. COMP. LAWS § 600.5001 (1987); U.A.A. §
1.
322. 703 N.E.2d 532 (I1. App. Ct. 1998).
323. Id. at 533.
324. Id. at 533-34.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 534.
328. Id.
329. Id.
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During arbitration of the pending matters, the arbitrator refused to hear
arguments related to either F&S's dismissed complaint or claims of attorney
misconduct during discovery. 3 0 The arbitrator ruled in favor of the Taylors and also
made special findings that F&S materially breached the contract and that F&S was
involved in deceptive practices in violation of the Consumer Fraud Act ("CFA").33'
F&S argued that the award should be vacated in that the arbitrator exceeded his
powers by ruling that F&S had violated the CFA.332 Particularly, F&S asserted that
awarding attorney fees to the Taylors, barring crucial testimony, and removing liens
held by F&S demonstrated evidence of the arbitrator exceeding his powers.333
The court focused on the fact that the award was based on issues that were
properly submitted to the arbitrator and that it contained an honest decision by the
arbitrator after a full and fair hearing of the parties.334 As such, the court would not
set aside the award for error either in law or fact. 335 The court also found credible
evidence that F&S was involved in deceptive practices, thus justifying the
arbitrator's finding of a violation of the CFA and the award of attorney fees. 36 In
addition, the court ruled that the.barring of testimony of an employee of F&S by the
arbitrator did not infringe on F&S's right to hear relevant evidence, in that, the
employee was allowed to testify at one of the hearings. 337  Finally, the court
approved the removal of liens by the arbitrator because the subcontractors hired by
F&S could assert their own legal interest on the Taylors' property.3
In Klatz v. Western States Insurance Co., 3 3 9 the plaintiff claimed uninsured
motorist benefits under his insurance policy.340 A trial was first held on whether
plaintiffs car had made contact with another vehicle; a requirement for being
compensated under his insurance policy?3' After the court ruled that plaintiff proved
contact, the court then required arbitration of the claim.342
Despite the trial court's finding, the arbitrators ruled in favor of the defendant
and awarded plaintiff nothing under his policy.343 The plaintiff filed an objection to
the decision on the grounds that the arbitrators ignored the rules of evidence by
failing to give sufficient weight to the trial court's findings, despite the fact that
defendant offered no evidence to rebut the claims. 3" The court found that the
arbitrators exceeded their authority by disregarding the only evidence presented on
the issue of liability and vacated the award. 5
330. Id. at 533-34.
331. Id. at 534-35.
332. Id. at 535.
333. Id. at 535-38.
334. Id. at 536.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 536-37.
337. Id. at 538.
338. Id. at 538-39.
339. 701 N.E.2d 1135 (111. App. Ct. 1998).
340. Id. at 1136.
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The Illinois Appellate Court emphasized the court's duty to construe "an
arbitration award so as to uphold its validity."' The court also emphasized that the
arbitration award in this case did not give the appearance of an "arbitrary and
capricious" decision by the panel.347 Therefore, the court held that the trial court
wrongly vacated the arbitration award because the judges were not free to substitute
their own judgement for that of the arbitrators.348 The award itself gave no
information about what the arbitrators considered in their decision, and absent such
a record, the court must assume no error occurred.34 9 The court ruled that the trial
court's vacation was improper, and reversed its decision.350
In Westridge Investment Group, L.P. v. McAtee,351 plaintiffs, Westridge
Investment Group, L.P. ("Westridge"), a real estate limited partnership, and
Ferguson, general partner of the partnership, attempted to vacate an arbitration award
finding the general partner liable on a promissory note.3"' Westridge had plans to
develop a retirement community and defendant ("McAtee") offered to purchase an
interest in the Westridge partnership and loan it $25,000.3s3 Ferguson accepted the
offer on behalf of Westridge and executed a promissory note to McAtee for the loan
amount, although McAtee received a copy of the Limited Partnership Agreement
sometime later.354
A clause in the partnership agreement allowed McAtee to pursue arbitration
after he received no interest payments on the note.355 Ferguson made no objection
to the proceedings on whether he was personally liable for the payments. 5 6 After
the arbitrator ruled in favor of McAtee, Ferguson filed a motion to vacate the award
claiming the arbitrator exceeded his authority under the Missouri section of the
U.A.A.357 by not complying with the provisions of the partnership agreement.358
The Missouri Court of Appeals focused on the policy reasons of why arbitration
awards should be upheld stating that "every reasonable intendment is given in favor
of an arbitration award."35 9 The plaintiffs claimed that the promissory note was a
capital contribution, thus not entitling defendant to any return, and that a general
partner had no liability for the partnership's actions.3" The court dismissed these
arguments, holding that the arbitrator had the power to resolve liability on the
promissory note because it was an issue connected with the Limited Partnership
Agreement.36' The court stated that it would not set aside an arbitration award






351. 968 S.W.2d 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
352. Id. at 244.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 244-45.
356. Id. at 245.
357. MO. REV. STAT. § 435.405 (1998).
358. Westridge, 968 S.W.2d at 245.
359. Id. (citing Estate of Sandefur v. Greenway, 898 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)).
360. Id.
361. Id. at 246.
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merely because it would have taken a different action.3 62 Furthermore, plaintiffs'
argument is in reality not that the arbitrators "exceeded their powers," but that the
arbitrator's interpretation and application of provisions in the partnership agreement
is incorrect.3 63 Therefore, the trial court properly denied the motion to vacate.
In McKibben v. Grigg,365 a dispute between the parties over a buy-out provision
in their partnership agreement resulted in an award that plaintiffs moved to vacate,
which the trial court denied.366 In deciding the parameters of judicial review, the
court examined the conflict between provisions of the North Dakota statutes and the
Uniform Arbitration Act.367 Although procedural regulation of arbitration agreements
was governed by North Dakota statutes at the tie the parties created a contract to
arbitrate, the adoption of the U.A.A. by the state effectively repealed those statutes
pertaining to contractual arbitration.3 6' The court surmised that the state legislature
would not intend to impair the obligation of the parties' contract, and decided to use
the common law rules as modified by the North Dakota statutes in deciding
procedural issues.369
The court of appeals first noted that even though an arbitration award may grant
relief that courts cannot grant, such a circumstance is not grounds for vacating an
award.37 ° Plaintiffs also claimed that the arbitration panel displayed partiality and
exceeded their powers in ruling on matters not submitted to them.37 ' The court found
no evidence of partiality and ruled that the arbitrators were proper in considering all
possible remedies because the parties submitted their entire contract for resolution.372
Since the arbitrators acted within their powers, the court found no reason to vacate
the award.373
D. Refusal to Postpone Hearing or Hear Relevant Evidence
In E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Custom Blending International, Inc.,374
the defendants ("CBI") sought to vacate an award in favor of plaintiffs ("Du Pont")
for breaching a settlement agreement.3 7' The parties had entered into an agreement
in which CBI would manufacture and distribute a tire service product containing a
Du Pont Kevlar product. 7 6 Shortly thereafter, a third party, Parsons, sued Du Pont




365. 582 N.W.2d 669 (N.D. Ct. App. 1998).
366. Id. at 670-71.
367. Id. at 671. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-29.20 (1999).
368. McKibben, 582 N.W.2d at 671-72. See 1987 N.D. LAWS ch. 408, § 23.
369. McKibben, 582 N.W.2d at 672.
370. Id. at 670-71. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-29.2-12(1) (1999).
371. McKibben, 582 N.W.2d at 673.
372. Id. at 673-74.
373. Id. at 674.
374. No. C.A. 16295-NC, 1998 WL 842289 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 1998).
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products it sold as Kevlar.377 Evidence was presented by Parsons that demonstrated
that it obtained its Kevlar products from CBI.371 Because of a dispute between Du
Pont and CBI over their settlement agreement, including the alleged improper sale
of Kevlar products by CBI to Parsons, Du Pont demanded indemnification from CBI
over the dispute with Parsons." 9
An arbitration proceeding was then commenced pursuant to the parties'
settlement agreement, and an initial determination was made in favor of Du Pont.38 °
CBI originally argued that they would not comply with this determination, but over
a month after the arbitration they asked the arbitrators to delay their ruling following
additional discovery in the Parsons litigation.3"' CBI alleged that such discovery
would show that they were under duress when the settlement agreement was signed
with DuPont.382
The court emphasized the wide discretion given to arbitrators, and stated that
review of an award is "narrowly circumscribed" and awards will be upheld if "any
grounds for the award can be inferred from the record. 38 3 In rejecting the duress
claim, the court noted that CBI participated in the arbitration hearing without
objection and that the threat of litigation by Du Pont, assuming the claim was in
good faith, could not constitute duress.3 CBI was also unsuccessful in proving that
the arbitrators disregarded the applicable law because the court found that the
arbitrators could distinguish this factual situation from other similar cases.3"'
Moreover, there was no direct evidence presented that the arbitrators knew the law,
but chose to ignore it.3"6 The court also found the arbitrators were justified in
refusing to postpone proceedings. 8 7  The court reached this conclusion by
considering the dispute resolution clause of the settlement agreement which required
a hearing within thirty days, and the fact that CBI made the postponement request
well after the hearing and initial determination.3 8 Finally, the court ruled that the
question was a closer call regarding the interpretation of some of the terms of the
settlement agreement regarding CBI's duty to defend Du Pont.389 However, since
the parties had to return to arbitration regarding the ongoing Parson's litigation, the
court refused to vacate the award.39
377. Id.
378. Id. at *1-2.
379. Id. at *2.
380. Id.
381. Id. at *3.
382. Id.
383. Id. at *4 (citing Audio Jam, Inc. v. Fazelli, C.A. No. 14368, 1997 WL 153814, at *3 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 20, 1997) (mem.)).
384. Id.
385. Id. at *5-6.
386. Id.
387. Id. at *7-8.
388. Id.
389. Id. at *8-9.
390. Id.
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E. Non-Final Award Grounds to Vacate an Award
A court reviewing an arbitration award should usually either enforce or vacate
the award, but where appropriate, may remand to the arbitrator for further
findings.39" ' In GES Exposition Services, Inc. v. Bates,392 the defendants sued for
denial of employment in retaliation for exercising rights under the Illinois Workers'
Compensation Act.393 A settlement agreement was reached between the parties
which provided that the arbitration procedure would be the exclusive means by
which they would resolve disputes concerning certain rights. 394 After the arbitrator
found for the defendants, the plaintiffs sought to vacate the award on the grounds
that the arbitrator exceeded his authority.395
The court denied the motion to vacate, finding that the award was not a final one
in which the court could render a judgment and, in fact, stated that the award
envisioned further action by the parties and the arbitrator.396 Because the parties
would be required to negotiate further and the arbitrator retained some form of
jurisdiction over the dispute, the court concluded that the arbitrator did not intend the
award to be final.397 The court found that the "question of remedies requires more
than mere ministerial action on the part of the arbitrator or the court."'3 9
F. The Exclusivity of Statutory Grounds to Vacate an Award
In Minot School Committee v. Minot Education Ass 'n,399 the plaintiff
("Committee") appeals from a decision of the Maine Labor Relations Board
("Board") in favor of the defendant teachers union's complaint of prohibited
practice.400 The main argument forwarded by the Committee is that the Board
exceeded its statutory authority to fashion remedies using the arbitration process. °
Maine statutes provide that public employees engaged in collective bargaining may
agree to binding arbitration to settle their claims, 0 2 but vacation of such decisions
can only be done by the superior court and not the Labor Relations Board.403 The
general grant of authority to the Board to settle controversies does not include the
power to vacate an arbitration decision in contravention of Maine statutes . 4  The
391. Young Radiator Co. v. International Union, UAW, 734 F.2d 321, 326 (7th Cir. 1984).
392. No. 97 C 3716, 1998 WL 142456 (N.D. 111. Mar. 20, 1998).
393. Id. at *1.
394. Id.
395. Id. at *3.
396. Id. at *4-7.
397. Id.
398. Id. at *7.
399. 717 A.2d 372 (Me. 1998).
400. Id. at 374.
401. Id.
402. Id. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 961-974 (West 1998).
403. Minot Sch. Comm., 717 A.2d at 378. In fact, vacation by the superior court can only be
accomplished in limited circumstances, those of the U.A.A. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 5927-
5949 (West 1980).
404. Minot Sch. Comm., 717 A.2d at 378. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 972 (West 1998).
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court vacated the order of the Labor Relations Board that vacated the decision of the
Maine Board of Arbitration and Conciliation.0 5
G. Time Limit Bar to Vacating an Award
When a party seeks to raise a defense to the enforcement of an arbitration award,
the failure to make a timely request to vacate the award will bar such a defense.
406
In Maltz v. Smith Barney, Inc., plaintiffs claimed that they filed a timely motion to
modify or vacate an arbitration award by resubmitting their motion within one year
of its dismissal on procedural grounds.40 7 The court held that the proper statutory
provision to apply was the Massachusetts' version of the U.A.A., which provides a
thirty-day time limit from delivery of an arbitration award to file a motion to
vacate." 8 The court rejected plaintiff's alternative assertion that any time limit to
filing a motion should begin running from the denial of their request for further
modification.'
In Kutch v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,410 the plaintiff
("Kutch") was a passenger injured in an auto accident in which the driver of the car
he was riding in carried State Farm uninsured motorist coverage. 4" Kutch was
entitled to recover from the defendants ("State Farm") under the insurance policy.
41 2
However, the parties could not agree on the amount Kutch would recover for his
damages, so the matter was arbitrated. 4 3 After Kutch was awarded an amount
greater than State Farm's coverage under the policy, State Farm refused to pay any
amount over the policy limit.
414
Because the defendants failed to apply for an order to vacate the award within
ninety days, as required by Colorado law, the trial court confirmed the award,415 The
court of appeals reversed, ruling that the policy limit was not submitted to the
arbitration panel and thus did not have to be raised in a motion to vacate, allowing
State Farm to use the policy limit as a defense to confirmation of the award.4 6
The Colorado Supreme Court held that under the Uniform Arbitration Act, the
failure by State Farm to timely appeal for vacation of an arbitration award "prevents
it from raising the contractual policy limits as a defense.., after the expiration of
the statutory time limit" of ninety days.417 The court explained that State Farm could
have sought to vacate the award on the grounds of "arbitrators exceeding their
powers" because Kutch's award exceeded the policy limits.4"8 The court surmised
495. Minot Sch. Comm., 717 A.2d at 379.
406. Maltz v. Smith Barney, Inc., 694 N.E.2d 840 (Mass. 1998).
407. Id. at 841-42. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 260, § 32 (1992).
408. Maltz, 694 N.E.2d at 842. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 260, §§ 12-13 (1988).
409. Maltz, 694 N.E.2d at 842 n.8.
410. 960 P.2d 93 (Colo. 1998) (en banc).




415. Id. at 95-96.
416. Id. at 96.
417. Id. at 97.
418. Id. at 98.
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that the award may have gone beyond the matters submitted for the arbitrators to
resolve, voiding the award for lack of jurisdiction." 9 However, the failure of State
Farm to timely make this argument prevents it from being preserved for review by
the court.420 The court likened the defendants' position to "that of a litigant who has
failed to file a timely appeal of the final judgement of a trial court., 42'
In Illinois Department of Central Management Services v. American Federation
of State, County and Municipal Employees,422 a mental health technician employed
by the plaintiffs ("CMS") and a member of the defendant union ("AFSCME") was
discharged from his job for using abusive and inappropriate language towards other
staff members.423 The AFSCME filed a grievance on behalf of the technician and
an arbitrator sustained it because of the plaintiffs failure to abide by discipline
procedures in the parties' collective bargaining agreement.424 CMS filed an
application to vacate the award ninety-one days after receiving the award, and
claimed that the award was against public policy and that the arbitrator exceeded his
authority.42 The trial court then granted the defendants motion to dismiss the
application based on the time limit required by the Illinois Public Labor Relations
Act.4
26
The issue reached the Illinois Supreme Court, which refused to review the
motion to vacate because the award had not been confirmed by the circuit court.427
The court held that an application to vacate is not the final step in a U.A.A.
proceeding, and that the award must be confirmed to avoid possible modification or
correction of the award.42" Thus, appellate review by the court of appeals was
improper.429 On remand, the trial court confirmed the award, and an appeal
followed.
The appellate court focused on two provisions of the Illinois act.430 The first
required an application to vacate be filed within ninety days of delivery of the award
to the applicant,3 1 while another stated that no provision of the act regarding
vacating an award shall apply to an award that is related to a collective bargaining
agreement.4 32 The court examined how other courts in Illinois have interpreted these
two provisions and concluded that section 8 of the Labor Relations Act was
controlling, stating that arbitration provisions of CBA's "shall be subject to" the
Act.433 Furthermore, the court found that section 8 of the Act overruled the clause
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 99.
422. 699 N.E.2d 594 (111. App. Ct. 1998).




427. Id. at 594.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 595.
431. 6 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/12(b) (West 1993).
432. Illinois Dept. of Central Management Servs., 699 N.E.2d at 595-96. See 710 ILL. CO1MP. STAT.
5/12(e) (West 1993).
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in section 12(e), as it applied to the facts presented in this case.434 The court found
this to be the most equitable result, instead of the 12(e) provision controlling which
would have given a party five years to move to vacate an award.43 Thus, the
plaintiffs failure to move to vacate within ninety days of receiving a copy of the
award barred them from challenging it.
436
H. No Arbitration Agreement and Issue Not Adversely Determined
In Bradford v. Denny's Inc., the plaintiff was injured at the defendant's
restaurant and suggested to defendant's counsel that the dispute be arbitrated.437 A
letter confirming the agreement to arbitrate was sent by defendant's counsel to other
parties representing defendants on certain disputed claims. 438 After the arbitrator
found for plaintiff, defendants objected to the award stating that they first learned of
the arbitration only one day before it was commenced, and since they never entered
into a contract agreeing to binding arbitration, the award was void and
unenforceable.439
Under Illinois law, a party's attorney is the agent for the party." 0 Since the
attorney's authority to act for the client can be actual or apparent, the "principal will
be bound [by authority actually granted to agent and] by the authority which [the
principal] appears to give.""'
The court found for Bradford ruling Denny's lawyer had apparent authority to
enter into the arbitration agreement." 2 Denny's had agreed to the lawyer's
representation in this dispute and Bradford relied to her detriment on the defendant's
attorney's apparent authority." 3 Thus, the court refused to vacate the award.4"
In Smith v. Smith, a special in camera proceeding by the trial court pronounced
the parties divorced and partitioned their property." 5 The plaintiff argued that the
findings of the court were similar to an arbitration proceeding, and thus may only be
vacated under the circumstances that fall under the U.A.A.46 The Tennessee
Appellate Court disagreed, citing factors such as the lack of a written agreement to
arbitrate, and the attorneys' failure to clearly indicate what form of ADR the parties
agreed to participate in. Accordingly, the court found that the U.A.A. vacation
434. Id.
435. Id. at 597-98.
436. Id. at 598. See also 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12(b), 13(a) (West 1999); Chicago Southshore &
South Bend R.R. v. Northern Ind. Commuter Transp. Dist., 703 N.E.2d 7 (111. 1998) (denying the
defendant's motion to vacate or modify an arbitration award because it was not filed within 90 days after
delivery of the award as required by the U.A.A.).
437. No. 97 C 1531, 1998 WL 312009, at *1 (N.D. 11. June 4, 1998).
438. Id.
439. Id. at * 1-2.
440. In re Estate of Maslowski, 561 N.E.2d 1183, 1186 (111. App. Ct. 1990).
441. Gilbert v. Sycamore Mun. Hosp., 622 N.E.2d 788, 795 (Ill. 1993).
442. Denny's, 1998 WL 312009, at *4.
443. Id.
444. Id. at *5.
445. 989 S.W.2d 346, 347 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).
446. Id. at 347-48. See also Hayden v. Allstate Ins. Co., 5 F. Supp.2d 649 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (claiming
that de novo clause in contract defeats public policy of the Indiana U.A.A. rejected because contract at
issue does not require binding arbitration).
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requirements were not at issue." 7 The court went on to modify the trial court's
proceeding to ensure the parties were properly divorced.448
IX. SECTION 13: MODIFICATION OR CORRECTION OF AWARD
Under the U.A.A., a court reviewing an arbitration award should confirm the
award unless certain conditions call for modification or correction of the award."'
Under section 13, these conditions are:
(1) [t]here was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake
in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the
award; (2) [t]he arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to
them and the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the
decision upon the issues submitted; or (3) [t]he award is imperfect in a
matter of form, not affecting the merits of the controversy.
450
Section 13 also provides that an application to modify or correct an award may be
joined in the alternative with an application to vacate the award.45'
With varied success, parties have used section 13 to petition courts to modify
their arbitration awards to force the losing party to pay interest on the award from
the date of its entry to the date of its payment.452 In Duffy v. Cook, the court held that
where the arbitration award itself did not include a provision for interest on the
award, the court would not extend the award to include interest. 453 The Duffj
plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement to arbitrate a dispute regarding
personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's
negligence. 4m An arbitration panel entered a $425,000 award in favor of the plaintiff
on February 12, 1998. 455 On or about March 18, 1998, the defendant's insurance
company tendered a check to the plaintiff for the full amount of the award.4
Plaintiff moved for an order requiring the defendant to pay interest on the $425,000
at the legal rate from February 12, 1998 through March 16, 1998.
411
The plaintiff based his argument on a previous Delaware Superior Court
decision, Continental Insurance Co. v. Rizzi.45s In Continental Insurance, the court
modified an arbitration award to grant the plaintiff interest from the time the award
447. Smith, 989 S.W.2d at 348.
448. Id. at 349.
449. U.A.A. § 13(b).
450. U.A.A. § 13(a).
451. U.A.A. § 13(c).
452. Duffy v. Cook, No. 16307-NC, 1998 WL 914267, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 22, 1998); Scott v. Erie
Ins. Group, 706 A.2d 357, 359 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
453. DuffIy, 1998 WL 914267, at *2.




458. Civ. A. No. 91C-04-191, 1992 WL 20022 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 17, 1992).
1999]
33
Hunt et al.: Hunt: Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
was made through the date that it was paid.459 The defendant in Duffy denied that
Continental Insurance was applicable and requested that the court establish a grace
period following the entry of the award in plaintiffs favor.' ° The defendant
conceded that it would then be responsible for any interest that the court found to
accrue after the grace period had run.46'
The Duffy court agreed with the defendant that Continental Insurance was not
applicable to the case at hand.4 2 The court found that where Continental Insurance
involved a "plenary action involving disputed issues of contract law," the case before
the court was governed by the Delaware Uniform Arbitration Act ("D.U.A.A.")." 3
The Duffy court reasoned that the Continental Insurance court allowed interest
because it "was satisfied that once the arbitrator's award was entered, the
enforcement became a contract dispute and... [the court was] empowered to order
prejudgment interest. ',464
Analysis under the D.U.A.A. would lead the Duffy court to a different finding.
The court cited its previous decision in Church Home Foundation, Inc. v. Victorine
& Samuel Homsey, Inc. 465 for authority regarding the D.U.A.A. and interest
modifications to arbitration awards.' Church Home Foundation held that the
request for interest should have gone before the arbitrator and that the court's limited
scope of review caused "[reluctance] to order prejudgment interest on an award
which does not grant or include such interest. '
Following Church Home Foundation, the Duffy court refused to grant interest
that would amount to "a judgment requiring payment of interest for a few weeks on
a sum already voluntarily paid."' While the court recognized the policy reasons for
requiring a losing party to pay interest on an arbitration award from the time of entry
to a fixed point afterward, the court reasoned that such a judgment should be made
either by the parties in the arbitration agreement, by the Delaware General Assembly
or through an amendment to the D.U.A.A.4 9 A court should only make such a
modification if "the agreement to arbitrate is entered into as part of a court sponsored
alternative dispute resolution mechanism, by rule of that court." '47
In Scott v. Erie Insurance Group, the Pennsylvania legislature had resolved a
similar issue." The Scott court referred to Pennsylvania Code, which states:
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided by another statute, a judgment for a specific sum of
money shall bear interest at the lawful rate from the date of the verdict or award, or
from the date of the judgment, if the judgment is not entered upon a verdict or
459. Duffy, 1998 WL 914267, at *1.
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. Id. at 2.
463. Id. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10. §§ 5701-5725 (1998).
464. Duffy, 1998 WL 914267, at *2.
465. Civ. A. 6513, 1983 WL 3093 (Del. Ch. Aug. 29, 1983).
466. Dufiy, 1998 WL 914267, at *2.
467. Id. (citing Church Home Found., 1983 WL 3093, at *3).
468. Id. at *3.
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. 706 A.2d 357, 359-60 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
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award. 47 1 Under this authority, the plaintiff requested that the court modify the
arbitration award to include judgment interest from the date the award was
entered.473 In this case, the court ruled that the losing party would be required to pay
the interest.
4 74
In Rus v. Family Land, Inc.,47 plaintiffs, the decedent's wife and the
administrator of the decedent's estate, asked the trial court to correct or modify an
arbitration award that had been reduced based upon the decedent's comparative
fault.47 6 The decedent drowned in a swimming pool owned by Family Land, Inc. 4"
The decedent's estate, the decedent's wife, Family Land, and Family Land's insurer,
St. Paul Insurance Co., entered into a binding arbitration agreement.478 The
arbitrator awarded $405,000 to plaintiffs for negligent infliction of emotional
distress.479 The decedent was found to be fifty percent comparatively at fault, and
plaintiffs' award was accordingly reduced by the percentage of fault attributed to her
late husband.8
The parties' arbitration agreement contained the following provisions:
The arbitrator shall decide the issues of liability, personal injury damages,
and all applicable law. After the decision is rendered, the matter is
resolved, any award arising from this agreement shall operate as a bar and
complete defense to any action or proceeding in any court or tribunal that
may arise from the same incident upon which the arbitration hearing is
based. 8
Plaintiffs nevertheless argued that their award should not be reduced, contending that
the reduction was an "evident error of law appearing on the face of the arbitration
award" that should be corrected.48 2 In response, Family Land argued that "the
finality of the arbitration award precluded plaintiffs from seeking reconsideration."483
Illinois standards for the modification or correction of an arbitration award
mirror the U.A.A.48 4 The district court noted its limitations in undertaking review
of arbitration awards.4"5 Particularly, the court noted how narrow the consideration
472. Id. (citing 42 PA. CODE § 8101 (1995)).
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. 29 F. Supp.2d 475 (N.D. Il. 1998).
476. Id. at 475.
477. Id.




482. Id. at 477.
483. Id.
484. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13 (West 1998).
485. Rus, 29 F. Supp.2d at 477. "Judicial review of binding arbitration awards is quite limited and
whenever possible, an arbitration award should be construed so as to uphold its validity." Id. at 477-78
(citing Lenma v. Harry F. Shea & Co., 628 N.E.2d 577, 580 (Il. App. Ct. 1993)). "Absent an express
statement to the contrary in an arbitration agreement, arbitrators are 'their own judges as to what the law
was."' Id. at 478 (citing Perkins Restaurants Operating Co. v. Van Den Bergh Foods Co., 657 N.E.2d
1085, 1088 (Il1. App. Ct. 1992)). "Gross errors of judgment in law or a gross mistake of fact will not
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is in regards to claimed errors of law. Under Board of Education of Chicago v.
Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. I,48 the court had previously held that "[o]nly
where it appears on the face of the award (and not in the arbitrator's opinion) that the
arbitrator was so mistaken as to the law that, if appraised of the mistake, the award
would be different may a court review the legal reasoning used to reach the
decision." '487
Based upon the foregoing, the court determined that while the face of the award
indicated that plaintiffs' award for negligent infliction of emotional distress had been
reduced by fifty percent, the award did not identify who was at fault.488 Yet, even
under the assumption that the fifty percent reduction was based entirely on the
husband's negligence, plaintiffs would still not be entitled to relief.48 9 Under
Wisconsin law, where the non-negligent spouse's claim is derivative of the negligent
spouse, that negligence is attributable to both spouses. 4' However, the district court
noted that Wisconsin law is not settled on the issue of imputing negligence to a non-
negligent party.491  Therefore, the court found that "since either result was
'reasonably possible' in light of the existing precedents, no basis [existed] for
overturning the arbitrator's decision," and the award would not be modified.492
X. SECTION 16: APPLICATIONS TO COURT
Section 16 of the U.A.A. provides for applications by motion to the courts to
review arbitration awards.493 Under the section, the making of an agreement to
arbitrate within a state "confers jurisdiction on the [circuit] court [of that state] to
enforce the agreement under this Act and to enter judgement on an award
thereunder." 494 Furthermore, arbitration awards rendered in a particular district give
courts in that jurisdiction the authority to confirm the award.495
In SBC Interactive, Inc. v. Corporate Media Partners, the parties disputed the
rights of one party to withdraw from their Partnership Agreement.497 The arbitration
provision of their agreement stated that "the arbitration hearing shall be held in New
York City or elsewhere as mutually agreed" and further provided for non-exclusive
vitiate an arbitration award unless the mistakes or errors are apparent on the face of the award. Even an
arbitrator's gross abuse of discretion is not grounds for modifying an arbitration award under section 13."
Id. (citing Perkins Restaurants, 657 N.E.2d at 1088).
486. 427 N.E.2d 1199, 1202 (111. 1981).
487. Rus, 29 F. Supp.2d at 478 (citing Board of Educ. of Chicago, 427 N.E.2d at 1202).
488. Id.
489. Id. The "choice of law" provision in the arbitration agreement indicated that the substantive law
governing liability and damages would be that of Wisconsin. Id. at 476.
490. Id.
491. Id. at 479.
492. Id.
493. U.A.A. § 16.
494. Chicago Southshore & South Bend R.R. v. Northern Ind. Commuter Transp. Dist., 703 N.E.2d
7, 9 (111. 1998). See 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16 (West 1999).
495. Maiocco v. Greenway Capital Corp., No. CIV.A. 97-MC-0053, 1998 WL 48557, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 2, 1998).
496. No. 16397, 1998 WL 749446 (Del. Ch. Oct. 7, 1998).
497. Id. at 1.
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jurisdiction in the state and federal courts located in Wilmington, Delaware for any
enforcement, modification, or vacation of any arbitration award.498 After an
arbitration took place in New York City, plaintiffs filed a motion in the Delaware
Court of Chancery to vacate the award.4 The defendant filed a motion to dismiss
stating that the Delaware courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction."
The court of chancery stated that the Uniform Arbitration Act alone does not
create exclusive federal question jurisdiction, and that state courts may have
concurrent jurisdiction under the U.A.A. under certain conditions. 50' In addition,
section 9 of the U.A.A. granting exclusive jurisdiction to the federal district court
where the arbitration took place was found not to apply since the parties specified
"any court having jurisdiction thereof' in their agreement." 2 The court ultimately
decided it had subject matter jurisdiction based on the inherited right to enforce and
vacate arbitration awards from the English Court of Chancery, which the Delaware
court split from in the eighteenth century. 5 3 The court recognized that the English
Court enforced and vacated awards arising out of arbitration agreements that existed
in eighteenth century England. 504
In City of Philadelphia v. AFSCME, District Council 47,"°5 an arbitration award
was granted in favor of a city employee seeking promotion.5°6 The employee had
been denied a promotion by the plaintiff ("City") and the defendant union
("AFSCME") represented her in filing a grievance against the City. 5° 7 Plaintiff
claimed that the merits of the non-promotion were not reviewable, and the arbitrator
could not decide the controversy between the parties. 5° ' The court disagreed with
the claim of the City, and stated that the arbitrator had jurisdiction to review the
collective bargaining agreement between the City and its employees. 5°9
Recognizing that the "essence test" required that deference be given to the
arbitrator's interpretation of the CBA if it can rationally be derived from the





501. Id. at *2.
502. Id. at *2-3. See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994).
503. SBCInteractive, 1998 WL 749446, at *4.
504. Id.
505. 708 A.2d 886 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998).
506. Id. at 887.
507. Id.
508. Id.
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XI. SECTION 17: COURT, JURISDICTION
Section 17 of the U.A.A. speaks to a court's jurisdiction to enforce an arbitration
agreement and enter judgment on an arbitration award.5 ' The U.A.A. defines
"court" as "any court of competent jurisdiction in this State. '51 2
In Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Systems Corp.,5 the parties entered into a contract for
the sale of a computer system that called for the parties to arbitrate any contract
disputes in California.5 1 4 Keystone, a Montana corporation, moved to compel
arbitration in Montana." 5 Keystone's motion to compel relied on Montana code,
which had been found by Montana courts to invalidate forum selection clauses that
forced Montana residents to litigate in other states.5 16 While section 28-2-7085" had
been applied to litigation, the court found that another statute, section 27-5-323,"8s
gave the same consideration to Montana residents in arbitration agreements. Section
27-5-323 provides in relevant part: "[n]o agreement concerning venue involving a
resident of this state is valid unless the agreement requires that the arbitration occur
within the state of Montana. This requirement may only be waived upon the advice
of counsel as evidenced by the counsel's signature thereto., 519 Because there was
no indication that Keystone waived its right to have the dispute arbitrated in
Montana upon the advice of counsel, the court held that any arbitration agreement
calling for a Montana resident to arbitrate outside of Montana was void under
Montana law.520
Triad argued, and the lower court agreed, that the Montana statute was
preempted by the F.A.A. and the arbitration should be held in California. The
Montana Supreme Court looked to Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto2' to clarify
the preemptive effect of the F.A.A.52 The Keystone court found that the holding in
Casarotto "stands for the proposition that a state law may not 'place arbitration
clauses on unequal footing' from general contract provisions." 5' Since sections 28-
2-708 and 27-5-323 invalidated forum selection clauses in both contracts and in
arbitration agreements, the Keystone court found that there was no conflict with the
F.A.A.524 Further, the court found that since Montana law did not invalidate the
parties' agreement to arbitrate, but instead limited the enforceability of the
agreement only as to its forum selection, Montana law did not conflict with the
511. U.A.A. § 17.
512. Id.
513. Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Sys. Corp., 971 P.2d 1240 (Mont. 1998).
514. Id. at 1242.
515. Id.
516. Id. at 1243 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-708 (1997)). This section of the Montana Code
provides that "[e]very stipulation or condition in a contract by which any party thereto is restricted from
enforcing his rights under the contract by the usual proceedings in the ordinary tribunals or which limits
the time within which he may thus enforce his rights is void." MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-708 (1997).
517. MONT. CODEANN. § 28-2-708 (1997).
518. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-323 (1997).
519. Keystone, 971 P.2d at 1244 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-323 (1997)).
520. Id.
521. 517 U.S. 681, 686-87 (1974).
522. Keystone, 971 P.2d at 1245.
523. Id. at 1246.
524. Id.
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general purpose of the F.A.A. 525 As a result, the court reversed the lower court's
ruling and granted Keystone's motion to compel the arbitration in Montana. 526
In Frizzell Construction Co., Inc. v. Gatlinburg, L.L.C.,527 the Tennessee Court
of Appeals found that the question of whether or not a contract existed between the
parties was a question of law for the court to decide prior to determining whether or
not the F.A.A. applied to the arbitration called for in the contract. 28 The dispute
between the parties arose from a contract for the construction of a hotel.52 9 Frizzell
filed a complaint in the chancery court to enforce a mechanic's lien and for breach
of contract, claiming that Gatlinburg failed to pay the amount due on the
construction contract.530 Gatlinburg denied that it owed Frizzell and filed a
counterclaim.53' Frizzell then filed a motion to stay the court proceedings pending
arbitration to resolve the contract provision. 532 In its opposition to the motion to stay
court proceedings, Gatlinburg amended its counterclaim and alleged that Frizzell
fraudulently induced it to enter into the contract.
533
Upon the motion to stay proceedings, the trial court retained jurisdiction to hear
the claim of fraudulent inducement, and Frizzell appealed that judgment.53' The
appellate court cited City of Blaine v. John Coleman Hayes & Associates 35 as
authority that the court should not order the issue of fraudulent inducement into
arbitration. 36 The court followed Blaine's reasoning and found that where there was
fraudulent inducement, there was no contract and, hence, no issue to submit to
arbitration.537 Therefore, the lower court's retention of jurisdiction on the issue of
fraudulent inducement was proper.
5 31
In O'Brien v. Hanover Insurance Co., 539 the Massachusetts Supreme Court
considered whether the superior court or an arbitration panel had the jurisdiction to
decide issues of waiver and preclusion.540  O'Brien involved an arbitration to
determine whether O'Brien had violated a non-solicitation clause in his severance
agreement with Hanover Insurance Company.54' The court concluded that it was
proper for the arbitration panel to refer the issue of waiver to the court for decision
because "[w]hether a party has waived arbitration is a question of arbitrability for the
court to determine."' 2 The court resolved the question of whether or not it had
jurisdiction to hear the preclusion issue based upon the parties' agreement to put the
525. Id.
526. Id.
527. No. 03A01-9805-CH-00161, 1998 WL 761840 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 1998).







535. 818 S.W.2d 33 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
536. Frizzell, 1998 WL 761840, at *2.
537. Id.
538. Id. at *3.
539. 692 N.E.2d 39 (Mass. 1998).
540. Id. at 42-43.
541. Id. at 40.
542. Id. at 43 (citing Martin v. Norwood, 478 N.E.2d 955, 958 (Mass. 1985)).
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issue before the court to decide. 543 The court found that since parties were allowed
to agree to rescind an arbitration agreement, it must follow that parties could rescind
the agreement as to a particular subject as with issue preclusion.5 " The court
recognized that it did not determine whether issue preclusion should be resolved by
the courts as a general matter, because this case did not require the court to answer
that question.
45
State ex rel. Telecom Management, Inc. v. O'Mally546 involved the court's
jurisdiction to order a change of arbitrators before an arbitration hearing had been
held or an award had been entered.5 47 The initial dispute arose over commissions
owed to Telecom Management, Inc. ("TMI") by Matrix Communications
Corporation ("Matrix") pursuant to a contract between the parties.i" Pursuant to the
contract, TMI demanded arbitration with the American Arbitration Association
("AAA").5 9 A panel was chosen in November of 1995, and a hearing on the matter
was scheduled for October 21, 1996."0 On October 2, 1996, Matrix filed a letter of
protest with the AAA and requested a new panel.55 Matrix contended that the AAA
had prejudged the matter and wrongfully ordered Matrix to provide confidential
information.552 The AAA denied the request and ordered discovery.553 Matrix and
Matrix's attorney made at least two other requests to the AAA that they appoint a
new panel, specifically stating that an arbitrator on the panel was biased against
Matrix's attomey.5-4 In response to having heard that Matrix intended to file suit
against the arbitrators and the AAA, the AAA wrote a letter to Matrix's attorney
which stated that, as a general rule, the AAA did not appear in litigation relating to
an arbitration, and that it was not proper for the AAA to be named as a party if the
matter proceeded before the court.555 The letter further stated that "[the AAA would]
of course abide by an order of the court regarding the continued service of the
arbitrators. 556
On March 28, Matrix filed a petition in the circuit court in prohibition and
mandamus against the AAA requesting that the AAA disniss the panel.55 7 TMI and
the individual arbitrators were not named as parties in the action. 58 The court found




546. 965 S.W.2d 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
547. Id. at215.
548. Id. at216.
549. Id. The contract between the parties contained in relevant part: "If the parties are unable to
resolve any controversy or claim or dispute arising out of or relating to this Agreement, the dispute shall
be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American
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the arbitrators should be recused and all documents and orders and other papers in
the arbitration proceedings should be sealed and not relied upon in any manner."
5 59
Matrix's attorney presented a copy of the order to the AAA.' ° TMI was never
served with a copy of Matrix's petition or the circuit court's order.56' The AAA and
TMI filed a motion to dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction' 2 That motion was denied.5 3
TM! then filed a writ to prohibit enforcement of the order asserting the court's lack
of jurisdiction to recuse the arbitrators, or to have recused the arbitrators in an ex
parte order of which TMI had no notice.J
In Telecom, the court found "scant court authority for court intervention into an
arbitration proceeding prior to [the entry of] award." 5 As such, the court found that
under Missouri's Uniform Arbitration Act, "the party claiming an unfair arbitrator
has to wait until an arbitration award is presented to be given judgment status to
present [a bias or prejudice] claim."" Further, the court held that even if there had
been authority to intervene prior to the entry of the award, TMI was a party to the
pending arbitration and had not been notified of the petition or court order filed by
Matrix.5 67 As such, the order could not be upheld.5 6
In SBC Interactive, Inc. v. Corporate Media Partners, 59 the Delaware court
examined whether or not it had subject matter jurisdiction under the F.A.A. to
consider a motion to vacate an arbitration award given by a New York arbitration
panel. °70 The parties had agreed to arbitrate their dispute in New York, but also to
"submit to the enforcement, modification or vacating of any award to the non-
exclusive jurisdiction of the state and federal courts located in Wilmington,
Delaware. 57' The court found that previous holdings had established that it had
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the motion." 2 Although previous cases did not
"identify the source of the subject matter jurisdiction," the court nevertheless found
that it was bound by this earlier precedent. 7 ' The court then sought to
"independently find and articulate the source of this state court subject matter
jurisdiction. 5 74 In doing so, the court recognized that precedent had provided that
the court's subject matter jurisdiction could not arise from the F.A.A., the parties'
arbitration agreement, or the Delaware Uniform Arbitration Act.5 7 1 Instead, because
the court adopted the inherent equity jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery of










569. No. 16397, 1998 WL 749446, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 7, 1998).
570. Id.
571. Id.
572. See Moss v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 581 A.2d 1138,. 1140 (Del. 1990).
573. SBClnteractive, 1998 WL 749446, at *2.
574. Id.
575. Id. at *3.
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Great Britain, it had subject matter jurisdiction "over the enforcement, modification
or vacating of an arbitration award rendered under the F.A.A. 576
XII. SECTION 18: VENUE
Section 18 of the U.A.A. directs the venue in which an arbitration hearing must
be held. Section 18 reads:
[a]n initial application shall be made to the court of the [county] in which
the agreement provides the arbitration hearing shall be held or, if the
hearing has been held, in the county in which it was held. Otherwise the
application shall be made in the [county] where the adverse party resides
or has a place of business or, if he has no residence or place of business
in this State, to the court of any [county]. All subsequent applications
shall be made to the court hearing the initial application unless the court
otherwise directs.577
In Coady v. Ashcraft & Gerel,57 the United States District Court for the District
of Massachusetts received a motion to transfer venue to the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia from the defendant law firm.5 79 The dispute in
Coady arose out of an employment contract that included a provision to arbitrate any
ambiguities or questions of interpretation.5" The case, originally filed in state court,
was removed to federal court.5"' Finding that there was an independent basis for
federal jurisdiction, the court held that the Federal Arbitration Act applied. 2 The
court proceeded to examine the motion for transfer of venue under the F.A.A. and
determined that applications for arbitration were like any other federal civil case and
were subject to transfer "to any other district or division where [they] might [be]
brought." ' The court isolated the venue issue as: "whether transferring this case to
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, where Ashcraft and
Gerel filed its complaint for declaratory judgment and damages prior to the filing of
this action, would further the interests of justice." '
As with any civil case, the moving party for a transfer of venue must overcome
the strong presumption in favor of the plaintiff's forum.' 5 A district court's review
of a motion to transfer venue involves considering "the convenience of the parties
and witnesses, the order in which the jurisdiction was obtained by the district court,
576. Id. at *1.
577. U.A.A. § 18.
578. 996 F. Supp. 95 (D. Mass. 1998).
579. Id. at 98.
580. Id.
581. Id. at99.
582. Id. at 99-100.
583. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994)).
584. Id.
585. Id.
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the availability of documents and the possibilities of consolidation."58 6 The court
must also consider "the nexus between the operative facts and the respective forums,
trial efficiency, and the forum's familiarity with governing law.,
517
In making its decision, the court considered the defendant's contentions
regarding convenience of the parties, witnesses, and availability of documents."'
The court said that under each of these factors, the "differences between Boston and
Washington are negligible and cannot weigh heavily in the balance."5' 9 The court
also criticized the parties' "jockeying for homecourt advantage" and characterized
some of the parties' arguments as "machinations [that brought] little credit to the
legal profession. ' '5s9 The court focused its ruling and its refusal to transfer venue on
the issue of trial efficiency.59" '
The court reasoned that the transfer of a dispute to the forum with the most
available judicial resources was a preferable means of providing the parties involved
with speedy, efficient and just resolution of their case.592 The distribution of
resources among the federal courts is far from equal, according to the Coady court.593
The court cited Chief Justice Rehnquist who had stated that with almost one in ten
offices in the federal judiciary vacant and with thirty-two percent of these vacancies
in existence for eighteen months or longer, these conditions were "judicial
emergencies. 594 These vacancies "contribute to a backlog of cases, undue delays
in civil cases, and stopgap measures to shift judicial personnel where they are most
needed."'5 95
The Coady court found that the case before it was "a perfect example of the
practical consequences of the Chief Justice's concern. While the District of
Massachusetts presently enjoys its full compliment of district judges and magistrate
judges, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia is in a state of
'judicial emergency."' 5  Judges should hesitate to transfer cases into these
overloaded courts, according to Coady, and judges serving overloaded courts should
not hesitate to transfer cases out.597 According to the Coady court, the judicial
emergency suffered in the District of Columbia and at least ten other jurisdictions
586. Id. (citing Cianbro Corp. v. Curran-Lavoie, Inc., 814 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1987)).
587. Id. at 100-01.
588. Id. at 101 n.7.
589. Id. at 101.
590. Id. In footnote eight, the court discussed Ashcraft and Gerel's argument that the application to
arbitrate should be dismissed pursuant to the "first-to-file" rule. The court found that Ashcraft and Gerel
did first file a complaint and the actions were identical in terms of parties and issues. The court went
on to hold, however, that concerns involving duplicative litigation and waste ofjudicial resources were
not present where one of the issues was an arbitration. The court distinguished the arbitration issue on
the grounds that it could be resolved swiftly, it could be inserted ahead of litigation, and the F.A.A.
commands the staying of any suit or proceeding dealing with any issue subject to arbitration in order to
avoid duplication. Id. at 101 n.8.
591. Id. at 101-06.
592. Id. at 103.
593. Id.
594. Id. (citing HON. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, THE 1997 YEAR-END
REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDIcIARY 7-9 (1998)).
595. Id.
596. Id. at 104.
597. Id. at 106.
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reduces the chance that citizens of these jurisdictions will have access to federal
courts equal to "that enjoyed by those areas of the country where adequate judicial
resources have been secured by the people's elected representatives." 9
XIII. SECTION 19: APPEALS
Section 19 of the U.A.A. lists the judgment and orders relating to arbitration that
may be appealed. 99 Under section 19, the following decisions or rulings may be
appealed: (a) an order denying an application to compel arbitration, (b) an order
granting an application to stay arbitration, (c) an order confirming or denying
confirmation of an award, (d) an order modifying or correcting an award, (e) an
order vacating an award without directing a rehearing, or (f) a judgment or decree
entered pursuant to the provisions of the U.A.A.6 Section 19(b) provides that
appeals from these judgments and orders "shall be taken in the manner and to the
same extent as from orders or judgments in a civil action."61
In Weston Securities Corp. v. Aykanian," 2 customers brought an action against
a securities dealer and sought arbitration with the National Association of Securities
Dealers ("NASD").603 The director of the NASD referred the case to arbitration and
the dealer brought an action to enjoin the customers from continuing with the
arbitration.6 The dealer claimed the customers' claims were not arbitrable under
the NASD code or that they were barred by a six-year rule on filing.6 s The trial
court entered a preliminary injunction enjoining the customers from continuing the
arbitration and ordered the parties to submit motions for summary judgment.606 The
trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the customers and compelled the
dealer to proceed with the arbitration. 6°7 The dealer subsequently appealed the
order.6" The dealer also filed a motion before a single justice of the Massachusetts
Court of Appeals to stay arbitration pending the appeal.6°9 Both appeals were
denied.61°
598. Id. The Coady court found that a state of "judicial emergency" exists in Alabama, California,
Hawaii, Illinois, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Texas and the District of
Columbia. Searching for an explanation, the Coady court held that "[i]t is interesting to note that the
burden of inadequate judicial resources appears to fall disproportionately on our largest and most
populous states. Perhaps this reflects the fact that these states enjoy less relative influence in the Senate,
where every state is represented equally." Id. at 106 n. 11.
599. U.A.A. § 19.
600. U.A.A. § 19(a).
601. U.A.A. § 19(b).
602. 703 N.E.2d 1185 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
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Unlike the U.A.A. or the F.A.A., the Massachusetts Uniform Arbitration Act
("M.U.A.A.") does not permit an appeal from an order compelling arbitration.6" As
such, the question for the court was whether or not the F.A.A. preempted the
M.U.A.A.1 2 The court held that the F.A.A. does preempt State law, but only to the
extent that it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.'61 3
An Oregon Court of Appeals decision on point was persuasive to the
Massachusetts Court of Appeals.61 4 The Oregon court explained that the "object that
Congress sought to achieve is simply that the aggrieved party have a right to appeal
at some time."6 5 Considering this, the Massachusetts court held that since the dealer
could assert his rights in opposition to a confirmation of an award in the customers'
favor and he could appeal an unfavorable award under the M.U.A.A., his rights were
fully preserved.61 6 Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal.617
In Thunderstik Lodge, Inc. v. Reuer,/8 the plaintiffflessor brought a forced entry
and detainer suit against the defendant which was compelled into arbitration by an
order of the circuit court.6 19 The arbitrator determined that the right of re-entry did
not vest in the lessor and found for the lessee.620 In ruling for the lessee, the court
found that the lessee did not breach the "legal purpose" provision of the lease in the
lessee's violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.62' The circuit court confirmed
the arbitration award.622 On appeal, the lessor raised the issue "whether a lease
provision calling for arbitration of differences, limits the lessor to that remedy, or
may the lessor instead use forcible entry and detainer relief.
' 62
The Supreme Court of South Dakota held that the contract between the parties
required the parties to arbitrate their dispute. 62 4 South Dakota adopts the U.A.A. and
under its influence,625 the Thunderstik Lodge court found, "[i]f any party to an
agreement providing for arbitration had any doubt whether the case should be
resolved by traditional judicial means or by arbitration, arbitration will control.'62
6
611. Id. at 1187-88. "[S]ection 18, by failing to enumerate orders compelling arbitration as occasions
for the exercise of the right of appeal, precludes an appeal from such an order." Id. at 1188 (citing Old
Rochester Reg'l Teacher's Club v. Old Rochester Reg'l Sch. Dist., 463 N.E.2d 581 (Mass. App. Ct.
1984)).
612. Id. at 1189.
613. Id. (citing Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 477 (1989) (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))).
614. See Mart v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc., 842 P.2d' 801 (Or. Ct. App. 1992).
615. Id. at 804.
616. Weston Sec. Corp., 703 N.E.2d at 1189.
617. Id.
618. 585 N.W.2d 819 (Dakota 1998).
619. Id. at 820.
620. Id. at 821.
621. Id.
622. Id.
623. Id. at 822.
624. Id. at 823.
625. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-25A-1 (Michie 1998). "A written agreement to submit any
existing controversy to arbitration or a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any
controversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." Id.
626. Thunderstik Lodge, 585 N.W.2d at 822.
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Where the lessor did not plead fraud, misrepresentation or wrongful act in the
contract, the court presumed that the lessor knew of, and intended to be bound by,
the contract's arbitration clause.627 The court thereby affirmed the circuit court's
confirmation of the arbitration award.62
In Fraternal Order of Police, White Rose Lodge No. 15 v. City of York,629 the
City of York ("York") appealed a York County Court of Common Pleas dismissal
of York's exceptions to an arbitration award.63 The trial court ruled that "the
exceptions were an appeal from a final decision of a common law arbitration, ruled
that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the appeal was untimely
filed, and dismissed the appeal by granting the Fraternal Order of Police's ("FOP")
petition to quash the exceptions. ' '631 On appeal, York presented the following issues:
whether the trial court properly dismissed the city's [York's] exceptions
to the arbitration award as an untimely filed appeal; whether the
arbitration award was an advisory opinion preventing it from having a
final and binding status from which an appeal could be taken; and
whether the trial court retained original jurisdiction and supervisory
control over the arbitration such that the trial court's review of the
arbitration award did not constitute an appeal. 632
On the first issue, whether the trial court erred in dismissing York's petition
requesting review of the arbitration award as untimely filed, York argued that the
trial court's reference of the case to arbitration was a means to assist the trial court
in resolving the case and as such, there was no time limit imposed on the petition.6 3
Further, York claimed that the arbitrator did not address the issues in the dispute, the
award could not be final and binding, and the FOP was required to move the court
for an order confirming the award before it was final. 634 The appellate court found
no support for this argument. 635 Finding that York voluntarily entered the
arbitration, the court stated that the trial court lacked "jurisdiction to entertain an
appeal to review the merits of the award more than thirty days beyond its issuance
or delivery." 36
The FOP argued that York waived the issue of whether the arbitration award
was advisory because York did not raise the issue before the trial court. 637 The
appellate court agreed and found that York had neglected to raise the issue in the
lower court.638
627. Id. at 823.
628. Id.
629. 708 A.2d 855 (Pa. Comrw. Ct. 1998).
630. Id. at 855.
631. Id. at 857.
632. Id.
633. Id.
634. Id. at 859.
635. Id. at 860.
636. Id.
637. Id. at 855.
638. Id.
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The court found that although York argued that the arbitrator failed to resolve
the issues in arbitration, York had "previously taken the position that the trial court
was not the appropriate original forum for the [issues in dispute]. 639 In light of this
position, York voluntarily submitted to arbitration.6"  Accordingly, under
Pennsylvania law, the court found that any petition for a review of an arbitrator's
award "shall be deemed an appeal from a government agency for purposes ...
(relating to limitation of time).""' Therefore, the appellate court held that the review
of the arbitrator's award before the trial court was appropriately considered an
appeal." 2
In Goldstein v. Depository Trust Co., 643 share owners brought a class action
lawsuit against Depository Trust Company ("DTC"), a securities depository, for
breach of fiduciary duty and negligence." DTC filed a motion to compel arbitration
and stay proceedings." 5 Seven years later, after an unexplained lack of docket
activity, the trial court denied DTC's motion to compel.6' DTC appealed that
order." 7 The class action argued that the trial court's order was not final and
appealable and that the superior court should dismiss the appeal as interlocutory." 8
In Goldstein, the superior court held that Pennsylvania appellate procedure provided
that "an interlocutory appeal may be taken as of right from any order which is made
appealable by statute."" 9 Given that the Pennsylvania version of the Uniform
Arbitration Act provides that a court order denying an application to compel
arbitration may be appealed, the superior court found that the order denying DTC's
petition to compel arbitration had been made appealable by statute and was properly
before the court.6 °
Transit Casualty Co. in Receivership v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of
London65' involved an appeal from an order denying a petition to compel
arbitration.652 The plaintiff brought the action in court against the defendant insurers
to recover for refusal to pay.653 Pursuant to arbitration clauses in the insurance
contracts between the parties, the defendant insurer filed a motion to compel the
matter to arbitration and the motion was denied.65 The defendant appealed this
denial.655 In response to defendant's appeal, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss,
claiming that the trial court's order was not appealable because it did not dispose of
all of the parties in the action since a named defendant, C.J. Warrilow, an
639. Id. at 859.
640. Id.
641. Id. at 860. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 933(b) (1998).
642. White Rose Lodge, 708 A.2d at 860.
643. 717 A.2d 1063 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
644. Id. at 1064.




649. Id. (citing 42 PA. R.A.P. 31 1(a)(8)).
650. Id.
651. 963 S.W.2d 392 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
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underwriter at Lloyd's of London, did not join in the motion to compel arbitration.6-6
The Missouri Court of Appeals found that Warrilow had been a party to the motion
to compel arbitration, notwithstanding the fact that he had not been mentioned in the
case caption. 7 Furthermore, the court found that the order was appealable because
Missouri's version of the Uniform Arbitration Act6 " takes "precedence over general
statutes relating to appeals ... because it deals specifically with the question of an
appeal from an order denying an application to compel arbitration." 65 9 As such, the





656. Id. at 395.
657. Id.
658. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 435.350-435.470 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
659. Transit Cas. Co., 963 S.W.2d at 395-96.
660. Id. at 396.
[Vol. 1999, No. 2
48
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1999, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1999/iss2/6
